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The Equifax Data Breach: An Opportunity to
Improve Consumer Protection and
Cybersecurity Efforts in America
GREGORY S. GAGLIONE, JR.†
INTRODUCTION
“Identity theft is not a joke, Jim! Millions of families
suffer every year!”1 Although this statement by Dwight
Schrute in an episode of The Office was intended to be a joke,
given the recent rise in data breaches, it is a reality to many
Americans today. A combined 200 million individuals were
affected by the Equifax and Uber data breaches alone in
2017.2 In total, over 2.5 billion records were compromised in
†J.D., 2019, University at Buffalo School of Law; M.B.A., 2019 University at
Buffalo School of Management; B.A., Economics, 2015, University at Buffalo;
Publications Editor, Buffalo Law Review; Certified Information Privacy
Professional/United States. I am grateful for my colleagues at the Buffalo Law
Review for their time and effort editing this Comment. Special thanks goes to my
family and friends for their support and encouragement, especially my fiancé
Theresa Johnson. Without their love and support, this Comment would not be
possible.
1. The Office: Product Recall (NBC television broadcast April 26, 2007).
2. See Mike Isaac et al., Uber Hid 2016 Breach, Paying Hackers to Delete
Stolen Data, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/
technology/uber-hack.html; Equifax Inc., Equifax Announces Cybersecurity
Incident Involving Consumer Information, EQUIFAX (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/09-07-2017-213000628
[hereinafter EQUIFAX].
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publicly disclosed data breaches in 2017.3 That number is
likely to increase in 2018 due to the massive data breaches
at Facebook4, Marriott5, and Under Armour.6 However, even
though there has been a substantial increase in data
breaches over the past few years,7 the legal system has not
evolved to provide protections for consumers.
Currently, circuit courts are divided over whether the
risk of future harm that data breach victims incur is enough
to establish an injury-in-fact for Article III standing.8
Additionally, in 2018, Alabama and South Dakota became
the final two states to pass a data breach notification law.9
3. See GEMALTO, FINDINGS FROM THE 2017 BREACH LEVEL INDEX 2, GEMALTO
(2018), https://blog.gemalto.com/security/2018/04/13/data-breach-stats-for-2017full-year-results-are-in/ (stating that over 2.5 billion records were breached in
2017, which is up 88% from 2016).
4. Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts
of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/09/28/technology/facebook-hack-data-breach.html. Facebook announced in
September that “an attack on its computer networked exposed the personal
information of nearly 50 million users.”
5. Seena Gressin, The Marriott data breach, F.T.C. (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/12/marriott-data-breach. Marriott
International announced in November 2018 that a breach of its guest reservation
database exposed the personal information of up to 500 million people.
6. Lisa Marie Segarra, Under Armour Data Breach Exposes 150 Million
MyFitnessPal Accounts, TIME (Mar. 30, 2018), http://time.com/5222015/underarmour-myfitnesspal-data-breach/. In March 2018 Under Armour announced
that there was a security breach with Under Armour’s MyFitnessPal system
affecting 150 million users.
7. See Herb Weisbaum, Data Breaches Happening at Record Pace, Report
Finds, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/
data-breaches-happening-record-pace-report-finds-n785881.
8. Dominic Spinelli, Data Breach Standing: Recent Decisions Show Growing
Circuit Split, ABA (January 26, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/data_breach_standing
_recent_decisions_show_gowing_circuit_court_split/. See also Bradford C. Mank,
Data Breaches Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the Supreme Court
Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2017)
(advocating for the Supreme Court to address this circuit split).
9. See EMILY WESTRIDGE BLACK ET AL., Key Features of New Data Breach
Notification Laws in Alabama and South Dakota, 4(5) PRATT’S PRIVACY AND
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With these two new data breach notification statutes, there
are now fifty separate state data breach notification laws.10
These laws differ in complexity and severity, making it
difficult for companies to comply with all fifty notification
statutes when a breach occurs.11 As a result, many data
breach victims are completely unaware that their personal
information is in the hands of hackers because either their
state data breach notification law is not strict enough, or a
company simply has failed to comply with the state law and
notify all the individuals involved in the breach.12 In short,
the law currently does not offer the proper protections for

CYBERSECURITY LAW REPORT 139, 147 (2018).
10. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications
-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [hereinafter
NCSL](providing a list of all fifty state data breach notification laws).
11. Bart A. Lazar, Security Breach Responses: As Important and Difficult as
Ever, CYBER L. & STRATEGY (June 8, 2018) at 6 (explaining the material
differences in notification statutes including “the definition of personal
information covered by the statute; the definition of a breach; exceptions for
providing notice because of the lack of materiality or risk of harm associated with
the breach; whether and to the extent encrypted data is exempted from a breach;
timing requirements for providing notice to individuals; the contents of a notice;”
etc. The many material differences between the notification statutes creates
“confusion and the unnecessary expenditure of time and resources figuring out a
company’s responsibilities, battles between companies and their service
providers about whether a notification should be sent, who sends notifications,
the content of the notification and when the notifications should be sent.”).
12. See Nicole Lyn Pesce, An Alarming Number of People Still Don’t Know if
They Were Hurt by the Equifax Hack, MKT. WATCH (July 25, 2018),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/an-alarming-number-of-people-still-dontknow-if-they-were-hurt-by-the-equifax-hack-2018-07-25; Paul Roberts, For U.S.
Consumers: Ignorance of Data Breaches is Bliss, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Dec. 21,
2017), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/us-consumers-ignorance-data-breachesbliss (explaining that the “U.S. lacks a comprehensive, federal data privacy and
data protection law that compels firms to notify consumers when their
information has been compromised” and the many state data breach notification
laws does not provide a uniform standard, which makes the likelihood of learning
of the theft of one’s information dependent in part on where one lives); Octavio
Blanco, Millions of Consumers Still Unaware of Equifax Data Breach, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-protection/
millions-of-consumers-still-unaware-of-equifax-data-breach/.
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consumers once their personal information has been hacked.
The recent Equifax data breach in 2017 showcased the
current cybersecurity problems in America today. This
Comment will focus on the Equifax data breach and discuss
the opportunity it presents to improve consumer protection
and cybersecurity efforts in America. The Comment will
argue for two fundamental changes to be made in American
law. The first change requires action by the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can use the Equifax
data breach as an opportunity to clarify the current circuit
split surrounding Article III standing for data breach class
action cases. This Comment argues that the Supreme Court
should follow the D.C., Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit
Courts’ recent rulings that allow for standing in a data
breach case based on the risk of future harm.13 The second
change in the law requires action from the United States
Congress. This Comment proposes that Congress pass a
federal privacy law that will protect consumer personal
information and provide penalties for organizations that
violate the law and harm consumers by putting their data at
risk. These two changes in the law will act as general and
specific deterrents for companies that fail to protect their
customers’ personal information.14 With these laws in place
as a deterrent, they will shape companies’ behavior to
improve cybersecurity efforts that will then prevent future
data breaches. In sum, these two changes to the law will
incentivize organizations to improve their cybersecurity
efforts and allow for better consumer protection before and
after a data breach occurs.
Part I of this Comment provides a historical background
of data breaches, highlighting the prominent security
breaches that occurred prior to 2019. Part II explains the
13. See Lee J. Plave & John W. Edson, First Steps in Data Privacy Cases:
Article III Standing, 37 FRANCHISE L.J. 485, 485, 487 (2018).
14. See BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing?, in THE
CLASS ACTION EFFECT (Catherine Piché, ed., Éditions Yvon Blais, Montreal,
2018).
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harmful effects data breaches have on companies,
consumers, and the economy as a whole. Part III provides an
in-depth evaluation of the Equifax data breach and how it
provides an opportunity for America to learn from the breach
to improve consumer protection and cybersecurity efforts.
Part IV details the current circuit split regarding Article III
standing in data breach class action cases, as well as an
overview of the privacy laws enacted recently in the United
States and abroad. Finally, Part V offers a proposed solution
including both the Supreme Court addressing the circuit
split and Congress passing a federal privacy law to improve
consumer protection and cybersecurity efforts in America.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DATA BREACHES

The Cambridge Dictionary defines a data breach as “an
occasion when private information can be seen by people who
should not be able to see it.”15 Under this definition, the first
recorded data breach, arguably, occurred in the Garden of
Eden when Adam and Eve gained unauthorized access into
the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil by eating an apple
from the tree against God’s command.16 The legal definition
of a data breach is “the loss, theft, or other unauthorized
access . . . to data containing sensitive personal information,
in electric or printed form, that results in the potential
compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of the data.”17
Still, under this definition, data breaches did not originate
when companies began storing their data digitally. Before
computing was commonplace, a data breach could constitute
something as simple as viewing an individual’s medical file
without authorization or finding sensitive documents that

15. Data Breach, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/data-breach (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). In this Comment the
terms “data breach” and “security breach” are used interchangeably.
16. See Genesis 3:1–14.
17. 38 U.S.C. § 5727(4).
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were not properly discarded.18 However, these pre-digital age
data breaches were not nearly as prevalent as the data
breaches seen today. Once data became digitized and stored
in large quantities, data breaches became much more
rampant.
The advent of the internet and the digital age has made
data19 more valuable than ever.20 Organizations now gather
large amounts of customer personal information and use this
information as an integral part of their business strategy.21
At the same time, technological advancement also made it
easier for cybercriminals to hack into an organization’s
system.22 Indeed, as electronic data storage increased in the

18. David F. Perri & Erinmichelle D. Perri, Acknowledging the “M” in MIS:
Managing a Data Breach Crisis, 19 J. OF THE ACAD. OF BUS. 9, 11 (2018).
19. Data is customer information for the purposes of this Comment. Data and
personal information are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
20. See The World’s Most Valuable Resource is No Longer Oil, But Data, THE
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/theworlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data. See also James
Grottola, Data is the World’s Most Valuable Resource, RINGLEAD (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.ringlead.com/blog/data-is-the-worlds-most-valuable-resource/
(explaining why data is valuable in the business environment and the importance
of protecting data).
21. James Grottola, Data is the World’s Most Valuable Resource, RINGLEAD
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.ringlead.com/blog/data-is-the-worlds-most-valuableresource/ (claiming that 97 percent of businesses use data to power their business
opportunities and 76 percent of businesses use data as an integral part of forming
a business strategy); see also Adam C. Uzialko, How Businesses Are Collecting
Data (And What They Are Doing with It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-collecting-data.html
(explaining that consumer data is often used by companies to improve their
marketing strategy and customer experience. Some companies even collect data
simply to sell to other companies).
22. See Andrew Rossow, Why Data Breaches Are Becoming More Frequent and
What You Need to Do, FORBES (May 23, 2018, 3:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/andrewrossow/2018/05/23/why-data-breaches-are-becoming-more-frequent
-and-what-you-need-to-do/#570d20bcd97f; see also Juliana De Groot, The History
of Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2019), https://digitalguardian.com
/blog/history-data-breaches. (explaining the four most common types of data
breaches: ransomware, malware, phishing, and denial-of-service, all four of
which use computer software to hack into computer systems).
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1980s and 1990s, it inevitably led to more data breaches. As
the world’s volume of data has been growing exponentially
year after year, it has given cybercriminals “a greater
opportunity to expose massive amounts of data in a single
breach.”23 Therefore, with data more valuable than ever and
technological
innovation
at
an
all-time
high,
24
cybercriminals now have the technological ability and a
monetary incentive to hack into an organization’s
information system and steal the personal information of
millions of Americans.25
The first reported digital data breach was the AOL data
breach in 2004, where a twenty-four-year-old AOL employee
stole 92 million customer email addresses and screen names
with the intention of selling the information to bulk
emailers.26 As a result, AOL users received excess spam from
those who had purchased their emails and usernames.27
Around the same time as the AOL breach, public awareness
of the potential for data breaches began to rise.
Consequently, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,28 a non-profit

23. De Groot, supra note 22.
24. In this Comment,
interchangeably.

“cybercriminals”

and

“hackers”

are

used

25. See Vivek Sharma, Why Do Data Breaches Happen?, USC MARSHALL SCH.
BUS. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.marshall.usc.edu/blog/why-do-databreaches-happen. (explaining that after a massive data breach, cybercriminals
will sell the stolen data to other criminals who will use it to make fraudulent
purchases).
OF

26. Davis Stout, AOL Engineer Sold 92 Million Names to Spammer, U.S.
Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/
technology/aol-engineer-sold-92-million-names-to-spammer-us-says.html.
See
also Meg Krafft, A Brief History of Data Breaches, THE SEC. AWARENESS CO. (Mar.
6, 2018), https://www.thesecurityawarenesscompany.com/2018/03/06/briefhistory-data-breaches/.
27. Krafft, supra note 26. Luckily, passwords and credit card numbers were
not breached, leaving this data breach less harmful than the Equifax data breach
and others that have occurred recently.
28. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization
protecting privacy for all by empowering individuals and advocating for positive
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organization advocating for privacy protection, began
recording and gathering information on data breaches in
2005.
The year 2005 also became infamous as the year of the
first data breach to compromise more than 1 million records
when DSW Shoe Warehouse had 1.4 million credit card
numbers and names on accounts hacked.29 In the same year,
the first data breach to affect a college campus occurred when
George Mason University was breached in January of 2005
where names, pictures, and Social Security numbers of
32,000 students and staff were exposed to hackers.30
Since 2005, data breaches have become larger and more
dangerous with each passing year. Accordingly, in 2009, the
first breach to involve over 100 million records was recorded
when Heartland Payment Systems experienced a breach
that exposed 130 million credit card accounts.31 Following
the Heartland breach, data breaches continued to reach new
heights. In 2013, Target was involved in a highly-publicized
change. Clearinghouse, About Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/about. In total, Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse reports that there have been over 11 billion records breached from
over 9,000 data breaches made public from 2005 to 2019. Clearinghouse, Data
Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/databreaches (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
29. Symantic Corporation, A Brief History of Data Breaches, LIFELOCK
(2018), https://www.lifelock.com/education/history-of-data-breaches/ [hereinafter
LIFELOCK]. See generally Clearinghouse, Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches?title=&taxonomy
_vocabulary_11_tid%5B%5D=271 (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) (listing all of the
significant data breaches in 2005 and the relevant information regarding each
breach).
30. LIFELOCK, supra note 29. See also Clearinghouse, Data Breaches by
Organization Type, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights
.org/data-breaches/organization?taxonomy_vocabulary_11_tid=2434 (last visited
Jan. 4, 2019) (providing information on each organization affected by a data
breach, including the education sector which represents a significant portion of
organizations affected by a data breach each year).
31. Data Breaches by Organization Type, supra note 30. See also Data
Breaches, supra note 29. (providing the pertinent information regarding the
Heartland Payment Systems data breach in 2009).
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data breach where 110 million individuals’ payment and
contact information were exposed.32 However, the Target
breach was not even the largest breach of 2013. Yahoo! took
the crown as the largest data breach in that year when it
experienced a breach exposing over 3 billion user accounts.33
Yahoo! initially discovered the breach in September 2016
and disclosed that 500 million accounts were hacked in 2014.
After further review, Yahoo! announced that an initial
breach occurred in 2013 and affected 1 billion user accounts.
Finally, in 2017 Yahoo! revised that estimate and
acknowledged that the breach actually exposed all 3 billion
user accounts within Yahoo!. Yahoo!’s security breach
exposed the names, dates of birth, email addresses,
passwords, security questions and answers of its users. To
date, the Yahoo! data breach is the largest data breach in the
United States.34
Data breaches gained more fame when a breach affected
high-profile Hollywood actors, actresses, and executives in
2014. Sony Pictures Studio was breached in 2014 when large
amounts of confidential documents were stolen by
cybercriminals who called themselves “Guardians of the
Peace.”35 These cybercriminals then posted massive amounts
of internal Sony documents in the weeks following the
breach, many of which included embarrassing information

32. LIFELOCK, supra note 29. Target initially confirmed that 40 million
customers’ debit and credit card information was stolen. Then, weeks later,
Target stated that 70 million people’s email and mailing addresses were stolen.
33. Jethro Mullen & Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Tops the List of Largest Ever
Data Breaches, CNN BUS. (Oct. 4, 2017, 5:20 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/
10/04/technology/yahoo-biggest-data-breaches-ever/index.html.
34. Soo Youn, Marriott’s Data Breach is Large, But It’s Not the Largest: These
are the Five Worse Corporate Hacks, ABC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2018, 6:07 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/marriotts-data-breach-large-largest-worstcorporate-hacks/story?id=59520391.
35. Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec.
18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/thesony-pictures-hack-explained/?utm_term=.6727c19f1378.
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about Hollywood stars.36 Less than a month after the breach,
the FBI concluded that the North Korean government was
behind the security incident.37 Guardians of the Peace
targeted Sony because of the potential release of its new
movie The Interview, a comedy about a pair of American
journalists sent to assassinate North Korean dictator Kim
Jong Un.38 Although the Sony breach did not expose a large
amount of consumer personal information, it did highlight
the dangers that data breaches pose to our country.39 The
Sony breach displayed how a foreign country can inflict
significant harm on a U.S. business, the U.S. government,
and its citizens by targeting a business with a data breach.40
Following the highly-publicized Sony breach, data
breaches continued to rise41 in the U.S., leading to the year

36. Id. See also JOSEPHINE WOLFF, YOU’LL SEE THIS MESSAGE WHEN IT IS TOO
LATE, 166 (Sandra Braman ed., 2018) (“they [the Sony hackers] were looking to
cause chaos—to publicly shame and torment SPE [Sony Pictures Entertainment]
and its employees before as wide a global audience as possible by any means
available, ranging from releasing high-level executives’ embarrassing email
exchanges and salary data, to posting employee Social Security numbers and
financial information, to disseminating as-yet-unreleased movies and scripts.”).
37. WOLFF, supra note 36, at 172. See also Jake Miller, FBI Sources: Sony
Pictures Cyberattack Traced to North Korea, CBS NEWS (Dec. 18, 2014 7:52 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-north-korean-hackers-behind-sony-picturescyberattack/.
38. Miller, supra note 37; see also Peterson, supra note 35 (“Sony Pictures
canceled the theatrical release of the film Wednesday, responding to a vague
threat against theaters showing the film supposedly posted by the hackers.”).
39. Julia Boorstin, The Sony Hack: One Year Later, CNBC (Nov. 25, 2015,
10:26 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/24/the-sony-hack-one-year-later.html.
(“The [Sony] hack revealed the personal information of tens of thousands of
people, exposed embarrassing email exchanges between high-powered actors and
executives”).
40. See WOLFF, supra note 36, at 172–81.
41. See Charles Riley, Insurance Giant Anthem Hit by Massive Data Breach,
CNN BUS. (Feb. 6, 2015, 10:52 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/02/04/
technology/anthem-insurance-hack-data-security/ (discussing the health insurer
Anthem, Inc.’s breach in 2015, which affected 78.8 million customers, exposing
names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and even employment information of
current and former customers.). See also U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
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2017 where data breaches reached an all-time high of 1,579
breaches in one year.42 The most notable data breaches in
2017 were the Uber and Equifax data breaches, which
dominated news headlines. The Equifax data breach affected
over 140 million Americans and is discussed extensively in
Part III of this Comment.43 Outside of the Equifax data
breach, the second most prominent data breach disclosed in
2017 was the Uber data breach. Although the security breach
occurred in 2016, Uber executives concealed the breach from
the public for over a year and finally publicly disclosed the
breach in November 2017.44 On November 21, 2017, Uber’s
CEO disclosed that 57 million users’ personal information
had been breached, which included some 600,000 names and
driver’s license numbers in the United States, as well as
names, email addresses, and mobile phone numbers of
riders.45 A strong reaction followed the Uber data breach
because of the way the company completely mishandled the
security breach. Uber customers were shocked and outraged
that a company would pay hackers to cover up a breach and
allow the public to go uninformed that their personal
information was in the hands of cybercriminals for over a

Cybersecurity Incidents, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cyber
security-incidents/ (discussing the United States Personnel Management 2015
breach exposing personal information of 21.5 million current, former, and
prospective federal employees).
42. CyberScout, 2017 Annual Data Breach Year-End Review, IDENTITY THEFT
RESOURCE CTR., 3 (2017), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2017
Breaches/2017AnnualDataBreachYearEndReview.pdf.
43. See infra Part III.
44. See Andy Greenberg, Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off Hacker’s to Hide a 57Million User Data Breach, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2017, 7:56 PM), https://www.wired
.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/ (stating
that “Uber paid a $100,000 ransom to its hackers to keep the breach quiet and
delete the data they’d stolen. It then failed to disclose the attack to the public—
potentially violating breach disclosure laws in many of the states where its users
reside—and also kept the data theft secret from the FTC.”).
45. Dara Khosrowshahi, 2016 Data Security Incident, UBER NEWSROOM (Nov.
21, 2017), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/2016-data-incident/.
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year.46 Although Uber acted in a completely unprofessional
and unethical manner, the company’s reaction to the breach
underscores how important data security is to a company, as
well as the strong incentive a company has to prevent a
breach from occurring in the first place.47 However, by failing
to disclose the breach in hopes of dodging negative publicity,
Uber violated multiple data breach notification laws. This
led to Uber ultimately agreeing to pay $148 million in a joint
settlement it reached with the top law enforcement officers
in all fifty U.S. states.48
This past year has been a banner year for data breaches
in the United States. Multiple retailers disclosed data
breaches in 2018, most notably Macy’s, Adidas, Best Buy,
and Saks Fifth Avenue.49 However, none of these retail
breaches compare to the highly publicized breaches that
occurred at Facebook, Marriott, and Under Armour in 2018.
On March 29, 2018, Under Armour stated in a press release
that a security issue occurred with MyFitnessPal, the
company’s food and nutrition application and website, in
February 2018.50 After an investigation, Under Armour
46. See Tom Ball, Uber Data Breach Scandal: A Shocked Tech Industry Reacts
to the Cover Up, COMPUT. BUS. REV. (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.cbronline.com/
cybersecurity/breaches/uber-data-breach-scandal-cover-up-reaction/.
47. See PONEMON INST., 2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY 29 (2018)
[hereinafter 2018 PONEMON INST. STUDY] (stating that “the cost of lost business
was particularly high for US organizations ($4.20 million). This cost component
includes the abnormal turnover of customers, increased customer acquisition
activities, reputation losses, and diminished goodwill.”). Therefore, Uber had a
strong financial incentive to hide its data breach because of the damage a data
breach does to a company’s reputation. See also infra Section II.A.2.
48. Ben Kockman, Uber, States Strike $148M Deal to End Data Breach
Dispute, LAW360: CYBERSECURITY & PRIVACY (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.law
360.com/cybersecurity-privacy/articles/1086585/uber-states-strike-148m-deal-toend-data-breach-dispute.
49. Dennis Green & Mary Hanbury, If You Shopped at These 16 Stores Last
Year, Your Data Might Have Been Stolen, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:39 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/data-breaches-2018-4.
50. Under Armour, Inc., Under Armour, Under Armour Notifies MyFitnessPal
Users of Data Security Issue, UNDER ARMOUR (Mar. 29, 2018, 4:30 PM),

2019]

EQUIFAX DATA BREACH

1145

found that 150 million user accounts were affected by the
security breach.51 The breach exposed users’ usernames,
email addresses, and passwords, but no payment
information was breached.52
Then, on September 28, 2018, Facebook announced a
data breach that exposed fifty million user accounts.53 This
breach gave hackers the ability to take over accounts,
impersonating users and accessing private information
about these people and their friends.54 Although Facebook
executives stated that there was no evidence that users’
password or credit card information was exposed, this breach
still gave hackers information that could be used for identity
theft.55 The most significant aspect of the Facebook data
breach is the possibility for Facebook to be liable under the
new European Law, the General Data Protection
Regulation.56 The Irish Data Protection Commission
launched an investigation into Facebook shortly after the
company announced the breach and the investigation “will
examine Facebook’s compliance with its obligation under the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to implement
http://www.uabiz.com/news-releases/news-release-details/under-armour-notifies
-myfitnesspal-users-data-security-issue.
51. Id.
52. Lisa Marie Segarra, Under Armour Breach Exposes 150 Million
MyFitnessPal Accounts, TIME: SECURITY (Mar. 30, 2018), http://time.com/
5222015/under-armour-myfitnesspal-data-breach/.
53. Allison Grande, Facebook Breach Leaves 50M User Accounts Exposed,
LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2018, 9:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1087537
?utm_source=ios-shared&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=ios-shared.
54. Deepa Seetharaman & Robert McMillan, Facebook Finds Security Flaw
Affecting Almost 50 Million Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2018, 7:17 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-flaw-allowed-hackers-to-take-over-useraccounts-1538153947.
55. Id.
56. Sam Schechner, Facebook Faces Potential $1.63 Billion Fine in Europe
Over Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/facebook-faces-potential-1-63-billion-fine-in-europe-over-data-breach1538330906.
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appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure
the security and safeguarding of the personal data it
processes.”57 The investigation into Facebook’s compliance
with the GDPR is extremely significant because it is the first
high-profile GDPR investigation and Facebook could
ultimately face a $1.63 billion fine if found to be
noncompliant with the law.58
Finally, 2018 ended with a massive data breach
disclosure when Marriott announced on November 30, 2018,
that hackers breached its Starwood reservation system and
stole the personal data of 500 million guests.59 The Marriott
breach started back in 2014 and affected customers who
made reservations for Marriott-owned hotel rooms from 2014
to 2018.60 After further review, Marriott announced on
January 4, 2019, that 383 million guests were affected by the
breach, not the 500 million originally reported. 61 Marriott
also revealed that the data breach exposed guests’ passport
numbers, email addresses, and payment card data.62 The
57. Caroline Spezio, GDPR Gets Early Test with Ireland’s New Probe into
Facebook’s Big Breach, CORP. COUNSEL (Oct. 3, 2018, 7:07 PM), https://www.law
.com/corpcounsel/2018/10/03/gdpr-gets-early-test-with-irelands-new-probe-intofacebooks-big-breach/.
58. Schechner, supra note 56. (“Under GDPR, companies that don’t do enough
to safeguard their users’ data risk a maximum fine of €20 million ($23 million),
or 4% of a firm’s global annual revenue for the prior year, whichever is higher.
Facebook’s maximum fine would be $1.63 billion using the larger calculation.”).
59. Aisha Al-Muslim et al., Marriott Says Starwood Data Breach Affects Up
To 500 Million People, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/marriott-says-up-to-500-million-affected-by-starwood-breach1543587121.
60. Nicole Perlroth et al., Marriott Hacking Exposes Data of Up to 500 Million
Guests, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/
business/marriott-data-breach.html.
61. Connie Kim, Marriott Provides Update on Starwood Database Security
Incident, MARRIOTT INT’L: NEWS CTR. (Jan. 4, 2019), http://news.marriott.com/
2019/01/marriott-provides-update-on-starwood-database-security-incident/.
62. Kirsten Grind & Dustin Volz, Marriott Says Hackers Swiped Millions of
Passport Numbers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2019, 6:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/art
icles/marriott-says-hackers-swiped-millions-of-passport-numbers-11546605000.
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compromise of passport information is especially dangerous
as it would be extremely valuable to foreign spies.
Accordingly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is leading
an investigation into the Marriott hack to determine who
was behind the hack.63 Similar to Facebook, Marriott may
also potentially be liable under the GDPR if it is found that
Marriott was noncompliant.64 In all, many high-profile data
breaches occurred in 2018 and further emphasized the need
for changes in the law to protect consumers and prevent data
breaches in the future.
II. NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
The increased frequency of data breaches in recent years
has created large negative effects on the American economy
and society in general. Data breaches cause problems for
three distinct groups in America. Data breaches negatively
affect (1) the organization that is breached, (2) the consumers
that have had their personal information stolen, and (3) the
economy as a whole.65 This Part will discuss, exclusively,
how security breaches negatively affect each of these three
groups.
A. The Effect on the Breached Organization
First, data breaches are enormously costly for the
organization that is breached. An organization that has
experienced a data breach suffers a loss in two ways: (1)
incurring increased expenses and (2) losing future revenues
and profits through customer loss and damage to an
63. Id.
64. See Joyce Hanson, Hospitality Cases and Trends to Watch in 2019,
LAW360 (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1110261/hospitalitycases-and-trends-to-watch-in-2019; see also Dan Clark, Experts: Marriott’s InHouse Team Has Much Work Ahead, CORP. COUNSEL (Dec. 3, 2018, 6:46 PM),
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/12/03/experts-marriotts-in-house-teamhas-much-work-ahead/.
65. See infra Sections II.A, B, C.
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organization’s reputation.66
1. Increased Expenses
A company subjected to a data breach will initially suffer
loss from increased expenses due to increased legal fees and
notification costs.67 A study of the cost of data breaches is
conducted each year by The Ponemon Institute.68 These
studies show that the United States consistently leads the
world, by a significant margin, in data breach costs. 69 The
Ponemon Institute’s 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study:
Global Overview found that the average cost of a data breach
in the United States is $7.91 million, which is almost double
the average global cost.70 A large portion of these costs
associated with data breaches are a result of increased legal
fees and notification costs.71 American companies that are
breached spend $1.76 million of the $7.51 million total cost
of a data breach on post data breach response activities.72
These post data breach response activities include “help desk
activities, inbound communications, special investigative
activities, remediation, legal expenditures, product
discounts, identity protection services and regulatory

66. See DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: A GUIDE
PRIVACY LAW, § 42.10 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2019).

TO

CYBERLAW

AND

DATA

67. See id.
68. PONEMON INST., Why We Are Unique (2018), https://www.ponemon.org/
about-ponemon. The Ponemon Institute is a research center dedicated to privacy,
data protection, and information security policy that releases a yearly review of
the cost of data breaches.
69. See 2018 PONEMON INST. STUDY, supra note 47, at 9.
70. Id. at 15. The global average cost of a data breach $3.86 million. The
Middle East is the second costliest at an average cost of $5.31 million.
71. Id. at 6; See also BUS. INSIDER, Data breaches cost US businesses an
average of $7 million—here’s the breakdown (Apr. 27, 2017 11:00 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/sc/data-breaches-cost-us-businesses-7-million2017-4 [hereinafter BUS. INSIDER] (Establishing legal costs as one of the ten
biggest expenses of a data breach.).
72. See 2018 PONEMON INST. STUDY, supra note 47, at 9.
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interventions.”73 Included as part of the post data breach
response activities are notification activities which, once
again, the United States leads the world in this data breach
cost category.74 The average American business spends
$740,000 on notification costs per breach, which is $440,000
more than the second leading region for notification costs,
the Middle East.75 The United States’ fragmented regulatory
approach is the leading contributor to these notification
costs76 because the many different notification laws make
compliance incredibly costly and burdensome for American
businesses.77
Currently, there are fifty separate state data breach
notification laws in the United States, all with different
requirements for notification and differing levels of severity
for noncompliance.78 As one would imagine, the variation
among state data breach notification laws makes compliance
after a breach extremely complex and difficult.79 When an
73. Id. at 28.
74. See id. at 9, 27. Although the Ponemon Institute considers post-breach
data response and notification costs as two separate cost centers, both are part of
the costs that occur post-breach and require compliance with the multitude of
U.S. notification laws.
75. See id. at 5, 27. The Ponemon Institute studied the Middle East region as
a whole, which for this study included the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia.
76. Id. at 6. The Ponemon Institute provides examples of notification costs
including: “Emails, letters, outbound telephone calls, or general notice that
personal information was lost or stolen. Communication with regulators;
determination of all regulatory requirements, engagement of outside experts [(i.e.
attorneys)].”
77. See Herb Wisebaum, The Total Cost of a Data Breach—Including Lost
Business—Keeps Growing, NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/business/consumer/total-cost-data-breach-including-lost-businesskeeps-growing-n895826.
78. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [hereinafter
NCSL] (providing a list of all fifty state data breach notification laws).
79. See BENDER, supra note 66, at § 42.04.
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entity discovers that there has been a breach in its system
one of the first action steps, among other things,80 is to call a
lawyer or team of lawyers to address the complexities of data
breach notification laws.81 These lawyers have the crucial
task of identifying which state laws have been triggered by
the breach and the requirements under each law.82
Once an organization experiences a data breach, it will
have to navigate the many differing compliance
requirements under the fifty different notification statutes.
First, an organization will need to determine if it is required
to notify state agencies in addition to notifying affected
individuals. Some state laws have no state agency
notification requirement at all.83 Other state laws require
notification to state agencies only if a certain number of
residents of the state are affected by the breach, whereas
other states require notification to state agencies regardless
of the number of affected residents.84 After determining
whom to notify, an organization will need to determine if
there is a specific time requirement within which it has to
notify affected individuals. Some states require notification
within a specific time frame, while others simply require

80. Id. (“Forensic experts may be needed to determine exactly which personal
data was affected by the breach, public relations experts may be needed to draft
and send letters to affected individuals, and management will need to meet and
make decisions whether to go beyond what the law requires.”).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See DIGITAL GUARDIAN, The Definitive Guide to U.S. State Data Breach
Laws (2018) [hereinafter Definitive Guide to U.S. State Data Breach Laws].
84. See id. See also Maya Atrakchi et. al., State Data Breach Notification
Laws: Overview of the Patchwork, JD SUPRA (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.jdsupra
.com/legalnews/state-data-breach-notification-laws-73889/; Jeffrey Kosseff, My
Company Has Had a Breach: Whom Do I Have to Notify?, IAPP: THE PRIVACY
ADVISOR (Mar. 21, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/my-company-has-had-a-breachwho-do-i-have-to-notify/. (“About 20 states require companies to notify state
regulators if they have informed customers of a data breach, though some of these
states only require regulator notice if a minimum number of individuals have
been notified (typically 500 or 1,000).”).
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notification “without unreasonable delay.”85 The state
statutes that do require a specific time frame all have
varying time frames within which an organization must
notify affected consumers.86
Then, after determining the various notification
requirements and time frames, a corporation will need to
determine what form the notices to individuals must take to
ensure compliance with each statute. Some statutes require
a direct notification to consumers with written mail or email,
whereas other statutes simply allow posting a notice in a
general circulation newspaper to satisfy notice.87 Finally,
after determining the form in which an individual must be
notified, breached organizations must determine what
information must be included in the notification to affected
individuals. Some states require specific information to be
included in the notice such as the date(s) of the breach, a
description of the information accessed by hackers, a
telephone number to call for further information, and a host
of other information.88 On the other hand, some state

85. See Definitive Guide to U.S. State Data Breach Laws, supra note 83. See,
e.g., IND. CODE § 4-1-11; ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2018); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 715C.2 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS
§ 93H-3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-1503 (West 2019) (All of these state statutes
simply require an organization that has been breached to notify consumers
“without unreasonable delay” and provide little guidance as to what constitutes
an unreasonable delay.).
86. See, e.g., 2018 S.B. 318, Act. No. 396 (requiring notification within 45 days
in Alabama); FLA STAT. ANN. § 501.171 (West 2019) (requiring notification within
30 days in Florida); S.D. COD. LAWS § 20-40-20 (requiring notification within 60
days in South Dakota).
87. See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 13-44-101 (allowing notification by first-class mail,
electronically, over the phone, or publication in a newspaper); S.B. 318, Act. No.
396 (requiring notification either by mail or email); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82
(West 2019) (requiring notice to be either in written form or electronic format
consistent with E-SIGN).
88. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-2 (West 2019) (requiring the notice
to contain clear and concise information regarding the type of covered
information that was accessed or acquired, a general description of the incident,
what actions a consumer should take to prevent their covered information from
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statutes do not require any specific information to be
included in the notification and let the breached organization
decide what information it will provide.89 In sum, fifty
separate state notification breach statutes create an
enormous compliance burden for a breached organization.
Consequently, these compliance burdens have caused a
significant increase in cost to a breached organization, which
ultimately leads to the United States leading the world in
data breach costs.
2. Lost Future Revenue and Profit
A data breach will have a substantial effect on customer
loyalty, which causes organizations to lose future revenues
and profits following a data breach. A 2017 study found that
70% of consumers would stop doing business with a company
if it experienced a data breach.90 In the United States
specifically, consumers are much more likely to leave a
company that has experienced a breach because they have
more alternatives to turn to after a breach, thereby making
their loyalty harder to preserve.91 With more notification
statutes passed into law in recent years and data breaches
dominating the news headlines, American consumers are
now more aware of data breaches and have higher

further access or misuse, and a telephone number that consumers can call for
further information and assistance); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171 (West 2019)
(requiring notice to include at least: date(s) of the breach; a description of the
covered information accessed or believed to be accessed; and contact information
for the covered entity).
89. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.010 (West 2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110105 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101 (West 2018) et. seq.; 2018 S.B.
318, Act. No. 396 (All of these state notification statutes do not provide a
requirement for specific information that must be included in the notification to
consumers; it is left up to the breached organization to decide what information
to include in the notification.).
90. See GEMALTO, Data Breaches and Customer Loyalty 2017. Gemalto is an
international digital security company that conducted a study on the effects of a
data breach on consumer loyalty in 2017.
91. 2018 PONEMON INST. STUDY, supra note 47, at 29.
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expectations regarding how companies should help them
following a breach.92
The increased consumer awareness has resulted in the
United States leading the world in lost business following a
security breach. Accordingly, a data breach costs American
organizations an average of $4.2 million in lost business. 93
This cost component includes increased turnover of
customers, greater customer acquisition activities,
reputation losses, and diminished goodwill.94
The enormous cost of lost business has the negative
consequence of incentivizing companies to hide a security
breach from the public. The Uber and Equifax breaches are
prime examples. When Equifax was breached in 2017, the
company waited two months to disclose the breach.95 Worse
than Equifax, Uber hid its 2016 data breach for over a year
by paying hackers to hide the data breach.96 It is now clear
why Uber paid the hackers to keep the security breach quiet.
Uber feared losing millions of dollars from lost business after
disclosing the data breach. With 70% of consumers likely to
stop doing business with Uber after finding out about a data
breach and Lyft being a suitable alternative ride-hailing app,
Uber was likely to lose millions of customers after disclosing
its data breach.97 Therefore, the current security breach
environment in America incentivizes organizations to hide
their data breaches because of the high costs and lost
customers that will result following the disclosure of the
breach.

92. Id.
93. Id. The Middle East has the second largest customer loss costs with an
average of $2.18 million. Therefore, the cost of lost business in the U.S. is double
that of any country in the world.
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
97. See GEMALTO, supra note 87, at 1.
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B. The Effect on Consumers That Had Their Personal
Information Breached
The individual affected most by a data breach is the
individual whose personal information was stolen and now is
in the hands of cybercriminals. The most obvious reason is
that consumers whose information is stolen are at significant
risk of having their information used to make fraudulent
charges to their accounts. Outside of this obvious negative
consequence to consumers, there are two significant negative
effects of a data breach on the individual whose personal
information was stolen. First, the person who has been a
victim of a breach may not even be aware that her personal
information was stolen.98 Second, even if an individual is
aware that her personal information has been stolen, there
is little she can do to obtain recourse.99
The United States’ patchwork approach to data breach
notification laws is a fundamental reason why many
Americans are left unaware that their personal information
has been stolen after a security breach. Although some
Americans simply have not put forth the effort to check to
see if their data has been breached,100 the current
notification landscape in the United States does not make it
easy to determine whether one has been affected by a breach.
The lack of a uniform notification statute in the United
States makes the likelihood of one learning of the theft
98. See Blanco, supra note 12; see also Paul Roberts, For U.S. Consumers:
Ignorance of a Data Breach is Bliss, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/us-consumers-ignorance-data-breaches-bliss
(stating that although “U.S. consumers are deeply concerned about the privacy
and security of the data they share online, [they] often assume that massive data
leaks and thefts have miraculously spared their personal information from
exposure.”).
99. See infra Section IV.A.3, for a discussion of the current circuit split in data
breach class action suits. This circuit split means that consumers who have had
their data breached do not know if they will be compensated for their lost time
and money.
100. See Pesce, supra note 12.

2019]

EQUIFAX DATA BREACH

1155

dependent on where one lives.101 All fifty separate data
breach notification statutes in the U.S. differ significantly in
what they require organizations to disclose to consumers, as
well as the manner in which to notify consumers that have
been breached. In 2017, only about twenty states had specific
provisions about how consumers must be notified and what
information must be contained in the message.102 There are
also varying levels of stringency within these twenty state
data breach notification provisions.103 For example, in Utah,
simply posting in a general circulation newspaper is
sufficient.104 Conversely, in California, there are stricter
data breach notification laws that require an entity to use a
broader media notification and send an email message to all
people who may be affected.105
Consequently, due to the ambiguity and variation among
state data breach notification laws, many Americans are left
unaware that their personal information is in the hands of
cybercriminals.106 A consumer that lives in a state with a
weak notification law, such as Utah, may not be personally
notified at all because the notification statute does not
require personal notification.107 Additionally, because of the
enormous variation among the notification laws, it is easy for
an organization to fail to comply with the requisite
101. Roberts, supra note 95.
102. Blanco, supra note 12.
103. Id.
104. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(5)(iv)(A) (West 2009); see also Blanco, supra
note 12.
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2017); Blanco, supra note 12. California
law also requires that the notification must be written “in plain language” and
provides the specific headings to incorporate in the notification.
106. See Blanco, supra note 12.
107. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(5)(iv)(A). See, e.g., Blanco, supra note 12
(explaining that inconsistent state laws result in not all consumers having
adequate protection in the event of a data breach and, in the case of Equifax,
millions of consumers still had not been notified that they were affected by the
breach three months after it occurred).
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notification statute, thereby leaving consumers unaware
that their personal information has been breached.108
Even if consumers are aware that their personal
information has been breached, current U.S. law does not
provide consumers with an avenue for the requisite recourse.
When an individual discovers they have been a victim of a
data breach, they must act immediately to protect their
assets. These actions include: creating a fraud alert and
monitoring accounts, obtaining copies of credit reports, as
well as potentially placing a credit freeze on credit files and
purchasing credit monitoring.109
These breached individuals spend valuable time and
money protecting themselves from further harm.110
Subsequently, these individuals should be able to recoup the
lost time and money they were required to spend protecting
their personal information and assets after the security
breach. However, the current circuit split in the law does not
always allow the affected consumers to sue as a class.111
Presently, circuits are split over whether plaintiffs meet the
standing requirements under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution in data breach class action cases.112 The Second,
108. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text.
109. See Susan Henson, Here’s What You Should Do After a Data Breach,
EXPERIAN (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/hereswhat-you-should-do-after-a-data-breach/; see also Seena Gressin, The Equifax
Data Breach: What to Do, F.T.C. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/
blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do.
110. Experian credit monitoring costs $4.99 for the first month and then $24.99
for the months following. Credit Monitoring, EXPERIAN, https://www.experian
.com/consumer-products/credit-monitoring.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2019)
[hereinafter EXPERIAN CREDIT MONITORING]. See N. Gregory Mankiw, PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS, 5–6 (Jane Tufts et al. eds., 2018) (“The opportunity cost of an item
is what you give up to get that item.”).
111. See infra Part IV; see also Luke Martin, Resolving the Circuit Split on
Article III Standing for Data Breach Suits, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Feb. 17, 2019
10:00 PM), https://cblr.columbia.edu/resolving-the-circuit-split-on-article-iiistanding-for-data-breach-suits/.
112. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 1327; see also infra Part IV.
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Third, and Eighth Circuits have all recently held that
plaintiffs in a data breach class action case lacked the
appropriate standing under Article III of the Constitution.
Conversely, the D.C., Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
have held that plaintiffs do meet the standing requirements
under Article III.113 This current split in the law makes it
difficult for consumers to file a class action lawsuit and
survive a motion to dismiss based on lack of standing.
Therefore, those consumers that have had their personal
information stolen in a data breach are left not knowing
whether they will have any remedy for the harm they just
suffered.
C. The Effect on the Economy as a Whole
Ultimately, these negative effects take a toll on the
entire economy, and all American consumers are left
suffering from the consequences of the many security
breaches that occur every year. Although American
organizations suffer a large increase in costs after a data
breach, the majority of these costs are not ultimately paid for
by the entity that was breached. Rather, these costs are
passed on to the consumer.114
113. Jason C. Gavejian et al., Fourth Circuit Weighs in on Standing in Data
Breach Litigation, NAT’L L. REV. (July 2, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/fourth-circuit-weighs-standing-data-breach-litigation (“Circuit courts
have been split on the issue of standing in the data breach context, with some
courts finding standing where only a heightened ‘risk of future harm’
exists, i.e. the likelihood that stolen data may be misused (Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits), while other circuit courts require actual harm such as
financial loss (Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits).”).
114. See Mankiw, supra note 110, at 499 (explaining the consumer price index
(“CPI”) and the produce price index (“PPI”), the author states “[b]ecause firms
eventually pass on their costs to consumers in the form of higher consumer prices,
changes in the PPI are often thought to be useful in predicting changes in the
CPI.”). See generally, MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE
LUNCH 95–96 (1975). In the context of corporate taxes, Milton Friedman explains
that a corporation is “a pure intermediary through which its employees,
shareholders, and stockholders cooperate for their mutual benefit.” That is, the
money sent to the IRS for taxes comes from the company’s employees, customers,
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As an example, the 2013 Target data breach resulted in
financial institutions absorbing many of the costs and then
passing these costs onto consumers.115 Banks, credit unions,
and credit card companies will then pass these costs onto
consumers in the form of higher average interest rates and
service fees to their customers.116 Financial institutions are
not alone, as all organizations will pass on the cost of a data
breach to consumers. Retailers pass their increased expenses
from a data breach onto their customers in the form of higher
overall prices for goods and services.117 Even if a company
has insurance that covers the data breach, the consumer still
pays these costs when the insurer ultimately increases its
premium to the breached company and that company
inevitably passes this increased cost onto its customers.118
An additional cost to the entire economy is the indirect
cost of increased taxes paid to law enforcement. In 2017, the
and stockholders. This economic principle is called “there is no such thing as a
free lunch,” meaning that even if something is offered as “free” there is always a
hidden indirect cost. The term originated from American saloons offering free
lunches to patrons but requiring them to purchase drinks in order to get them.
Therefore, the “free lunch” was paid for by the customer in the price of the drink.
See TYLER COWEN, AN ECONOMIST GETS LUNCH, 63–67 (2012). Applying these
economic principles to data breaches, we see that, ultimately, the consumer will
bear the burden of paying the enormous costs of security breaches. When a
company suffers a breach, it incurs increased costs associated with the breach.
However, the company does not bear the burden of these costs; they are
eventually passed on to the consumer through increased prices and fees.
115. See Ryan Tracy, In a Cyber Breach, Who Pays, Banks or Retailers?, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-a-cyber-breach-who-paysbanks-or-retailers-1389572452 (stating that post-breach banks and credit unions
carry the burden of closing accounts and reissuing new credit and debit cards).
116. Michael D. Simpson, Comment, All Your Data Are Belong to Us: Consumer
Data Breach Rights and Remedies in an Electronic Exchange Economy, 87 U.
COLO. L. REV. 669, 683 (2016).
117. BUS. VIBES, Data Breaches: How the Costs Gets Passed to Consumers (Aug.
23, 2014), https://www.business2community.com/tech-gadgets/data-breachescosts-gets-passed-consumers-0977859 [hereinafter BUSINESS VIBES].
118. Id. See Mankiw, supra note 110, at 499. See also Neil Amato, The Hidden
Costs of a Data Breach, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY (July 25, 2016), https://www.journal
ofaccountancy.com/news/2016/jul/hidden-costs-of-data-breach-201614870.html.
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FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center received over
300,000 victim complaints.119 American citizens pay for this
law enforcement through taxes. Consequently, more security
breaches will, in turn, mean more tax dollars put into law
enforcement’s efforts to combat fraud and cybercriminals.120
This ultimately results in increased strain on taxpayers and
the entire U.S. economy due to the increasingly large number
of security breaches.
Data breaches also have a negative effect on the job
market.121 A 2013 study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies postulated that cybercrime cost the
U.S. economy 500,000 jobs lost in 2013.122 Although this is
not the net loss as many workers will find other jobs,
cybercrime and data breaches may cause underemployment
if displaced workers do not find jobs that pay as well.123
Indeed, as the number of data breaches has increased
significantly since 2013, the cost to the economy has also
risen.124 The Center for Strategic and International Studies
119. Sam Wood, FBI Reports Cybercrime Cost the U.S. $1.4B in 2017, but the
Actual Number is Probably Even Bigger, GOV’T TECH. (May 10, 2018),
http://www.govtech.com/security/FBI-Reports-Cybercrime-Cost-the-US-14B-in2017-but-the-Actual-Number-is-Probably-Even-Bigger.html (stating that the
“second most reported offense was personal data breaches, which are used for
identity theft or industrial espionage.”).
120. See BUS. VIBES, supra note 117 (“indirect losses come in the form of higher
taxes paid for increased law enforcement vigilance of fraud and regulatory
compliance across the board.”).
121. Id. (It is “estimated that the economy as a whole suffers a net loss of some
500,000 jobs per year due to fraud related expenses to companies.”). See also
Eamon Javers, Cybercrime May Cost U.S. Economy $100 Billion, Says New
Study, CNBC (July 22, 2013), https://www.cnbc.com/id/100904224 (“cybercrime
creates a $100 billion annual loss to the U.S. economy.”).
122. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, The Economic
Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage (2013) https://csis-prod.s3.amazon
aws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/60396rpt_cybercrime-cost_071
3_ph4_0.pdf.
123. Id.
124. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, The Economic
Impact of Cybercrime—No Slowing Down (2018) https://www.mcafee.com/enter
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2018 follow-up study found that cybercrime may cost the
global economy $600 billion, or 0.8% of the global GDP.125
The internet economy, the fastest growing segment of the
global economy, was worth $4.2 trillion of the global economy
in 2016.126 Comparing the global internet economy to
cybercrime, we can see that cybercrime is essentially a 14%
tax on growth.127 Taking all of these factors into account, it
is clear that in the end, the entire American economy and its
consumers bear most of the burden of paying the cost of
security breaches.
In summary, data breaches have negative consequences
on the organization that was breached, the individuals
whose personal information was stolen, and the economy as
a whole. There are multiple ways the American legal system
could improve to help alleviate these negative
consequences.128 The infamous 2017 Equifax data breach
incorporated all three of these negative consequences.
Therefore, the Equifax data breach provides a great
opportunity for the American legal system to help relieve the
negative consequences of data breaches.
III. THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH
On September 7, 2017, Equifax announced that criminal
hackers attacked and infiltrated its servers.129 This data
breach affected approximately 143 million U.S. consumers,
which accounts for nearly 44% of the U.S. population.130 The
prise/en-us/assets/executive-summaries/es-economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf.
125. Id. at 4 (providing reasons for the increase in cybercrime’s cost to the
global economy).
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id. (“There would be real benefit to development and prosperity in all
countries if the international community made a concerted effort to reduce
[cybercrime].”).
128. See infra Part V.
129. EQUIFAX, supra note 2.
130. See id.
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information accessed included “names, Social Security
numbers, birth dates, addresses, and, in some instances,
driver’s license numbers.”131 In February of 2018, nearly five
months after Equifax disclosed the breach, the Wall Street
Journal reported that the breach was even worse than first
imagined and the stolen data also included tax identification
numbers, as well as driver’s license states and issuance
dates.132 Needless to say, Equifax’s data breach left millions
of Americans vulnerable to identity theft.
The Equifax data breach is unlike any of the previous
data breaches that American citizens have experienced. 133
Typically, data breaches involve a hacker stealing
usernames and passwords for a specific account.134 A hacker
can use that information to access the user’s account and set
up more fake accounts under the user’s name.135 Hackers can
also try to take advantage of the fact that many people use
the same username and password by trying to use the same
information to access accounts at other institutions.
However, the Equifax data breach has the potential to be
more damaging to consumers. This is because the
information from the Equifax breach can bring context to the
massive amount of data that has been stolen in recent
years.136 A cybercriminal can determine if a person has a
legitimate account with a financial institution from the
information received in the Equifax breach and combine that

131. Id.
132. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Equifax May Be Worse Than You Think, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/equifax-hack-might-be-worsethan-you-think-1518191370.
133. Ricardo Villadiego, The Equifax Data: Now That They Have It, How Will
Hackers Use It?, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbes
techcouncil/2017/11/29/the-equifax-data-now-that-they-have-it-how-will-hackers
-use-it/#2e6b56cb602c.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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information with the username and password information
from previous data breaches. This will allow cybercriminals
to maximize account takeover and conversion to fraud for
known accounts that contain significant amounts of
money.137 Outside of this unique attack, cybercriminals can
also revert to the more traditional path of identity theft by
opening fraudulent accounts using the victim’s personal
information.138 Equifax’s “breach exposed more than enough
information about each [consumer] to apply for loans, credit
cards, and checking accounts.”139 “Cybercriminals can use
these funds outright, or they can physically move money
from one account to another to ‘cash out’” and obtain the
actual funds these accounts are worth.140
To make matters worse, Equifax waited over a month to
notify consumers about the data breach.141 Equifax
discovered the data breach on July 29, 2017.142 However, the
company did not publicly disclose the data breach until
September 7, 2017.143 This failure to notify consumers put
these consumers in danger because their personal
information could have been used to open fraudulent
accounts, credit cards, apply for loans, and other actions that
negatively affect consumers’ finances. By failing to disclose
the data breach for over a month, consumers were not able
to take the appropriate preventative measures to protect
their financial information such as credit monitoring and

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Michael Hiltzik, Here are all the ways the Equifax data breach is worse
than you can imagine, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-equifax-breach-20170908-story.html.
142. Id.
143. Elizabeth Weise, A timeline of events surrounding the Equifax data
breach, USA TODAY (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
2017/09/26/timeline-events-surrounding-equifax-data-breach/703691001/.
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setting up a credit freeze with all three credit bureaus.144
Even after Equifax’s public announcement of the data
breach, millions of consumers are still unaware of the data
breach.145 As of November 2017, 71 million U.S. adults have
not heard anything about the Equifax data breach.146 As a
result, millions of Americans are left in the dark, completely
unaware that their personal information has been stolen and
is potentially being used to harm them financially.
Failing to publicly disclose the data breach also allowed
for potential insider trading within Equifax. Three of
Equifax’s top executives sold nearly $1.8 million of Equifax
stock in August, which was after Equifax was notified of the
data breach but prior to its public announcement of the
breach.147 When the data breach was made public on
September 7, shares of Equifax dropped around 34.5%,
falling from $142.72 to $92.98 per share.148 Needless to say,
these three top executives would not have made nearly as
much money if they had sold their shares after the public
announcement of the breach rather than before the
announcement. This prompted the U.S. Justice Department
to investigate whether these three top Equifax officials
violated insider trading laws.149 Equifax’s board of directors
also formed a special committee to investigate whether the
three top officials that sold stock in August violated insider
144. See Gressin, supra note 109. See also, Ron Lieber, How to Protect Yourself
After the Equifax Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/your-money/equifax-data-breach-credit.html#second.
145. Blanco, supra note 12.
146. Id.
147. Kevin McCoy, Feds reportedly investigate Equifax executives’ stock sales,
USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/18/
feds-reportedly-investigate-equifax-executives-stock-sales/677003001/.
148. Id.
149. Elena Holodny, The Justice Department has reportedly opened an insidertrading investigation at Equifax, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/equifax-hack-justice-department-investigationof-alleged-insider-trading-2017-9.
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trading laws.150 The committee concluded that none of the
officials that sold stock engaged in insider trading because
none of the executives had knowledge of the data breach
when their trades were made.151 Accordingly, this situation
highlights another potential problem with failing to notify
the public of a data breach; it creates a much larger potential
for insider trading with public companies that are breached.
The Equifax example illustrates the need for companies to
disclose data breaches as soon as possible so that not only are
consumers able to protect themselves, but it also does not
allow for illegal insider trading activity within the company.
Finally, in late 2018, the United States House Oversight
and Government Reform Committee released a report on its
findings from a fourteen-month investigation into the 2017
Equifax data breach.152 The report found two main points of
failure by Equifax.153 First, Equifax’s management structure
lacked accountability and had no clear lines of authority.154
This poor structure led to a breakdown in communication
between the company’s IT policy development and its
operations.155 Equifax’s second point of failure stemmed from
its aggressive growth strategy and accumulation of data,
which resulted in a complex IT environment.156 This growth

150. Elena Holodny, Equifax says its executives didn’t engage in insider
trading, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 3, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/equifaxhack-special-committee-says-no-insider-trading-2017-11.
151. Id.
152. U.S. H. R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT
EQUIFAX DATA BREACH (2018).

AND

GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., THE

153. Id. at 4.
154. Id. at 4 (“[A] lack of accountability and no clear lines of authority in
Equifax’s IT management structure existed, leading to an execution gap between
IT policy development and operation. This also restricted the company’s
implementation of other security initiatives in a comprehensive and timely
manner. As an example, Equifax had allowed over 300 security certificates to
expire, including 79 certificates for monitoring business critical domains.”).
155. Id. at 60–71.
156. Id. at 4 (“Equifax’s aggressive growth strategy and accumulation of data
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strategy resulted in Equifax maintaining credit information
on 820 million customers and more than 91 million
businesses in 2017.157 With a massive amount of personal
information in its system, Equifax was a prime target for
hackers and its complex IT environment left Equifax unable
to prevent an attack by hackers.158 Accordingly, the report
found that Equifax failed to implement an adequate security
program to protect the massive amount of sensitive data
Equifax held.159 As a result, the report ultimately concluded
that the Equifax data breach was entirely preventable.160
The House Oversight Report further concluded that Equifax
was unprepared to identify, alert, and support affected
consumers after the breach.161 In all, the House Oversight
report was damning for Equifax and underscored its many
shortcomings regarding the 2017 security breach.
The United States House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee Report released in December 2018
reinforced the need for improvement in cybersecurity efforts
in 2019 and beyond.162 Additionally, the events following the

resulted in a complex IT environment. Equifax ran a number of its most critical
IT applications on custom-built legacy systems. Both the complexity and
antiquated nature of Equifax’s IT systems made IT security especially
challenging. Equifax recognized the inherent security risks of operating legacy
IT systems because Equifax had begun a legacy infrastructure modernization
effort. This effort, however, came too late to prevent the breach.”).
157. Id. at 15.
158. Id. at 18.
159. Id. at 2.
160. Id. (“Equifax, however, failed to implement an adequate security program
to protect this sensitive data. As a result, Equifax allowed one of the largest data
breaches in U.S. history. Such a breach was entirely preventable.”).
161. Id. at 3 (“When Equifax informed the public of the breach on September
7, the company was unprepared to support the large number of affected
consumers. The dedicated breach website and call centers were immediately
overwhelmed, and consumers were not able to obtain timely information about
whether they were affected and how they could obtain identity protection
services.”).
162. See id. at 94–96 (providing recommendations to prevent data breaches
and improve cybersecurity).
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Equifax data breach highlighted the negative effects of a
data breach. The current United States legal framework does
not provide any help in alleviating these negative effects of a
data breach. Therefore, the Equifax data breach provides a
perfect opportunity for the U.S. legal system to adjust and
improve consumer protection and cybersecurity efforts in
America.
IV. ARTICLE III STANDING IN DATA BREACH CLASS ACTIONS
AND THE CURRENT PRIVACY LAW LANDSCAPE
Currently, there are two areas of unsettled law
significantly affecting companies and individuals involved in
data breaches. These two areas of the law are: (1) the current
circuit split regarding Article III standing in data breach
class action cases and (2) the current privacy law landscape
in the United States and abroad. First, this Part discusses
the current circuit split and explains why courts grapple over
whether consumers’ increased risk of future harm satisfies
the Constitution’s Article III standing requirements. Then,
this Part discusses the current privacy law landscape,
specifically, two new laws implemented in the past year and
how they affect organizations and consumers.
A. Article III Standing
To litigate in federal courts, plaintiffs must meet the
Article III standing requirements in the United States
Constitution.163 Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the
authority of the federal judges to deciding “cases” and
“controversies.”164 Article III’s case and controversy
requirement preserves the separation of powers within the
three branches of government by preventing the unelected
judiciary from exercising executive or legislative powers.165
163. See U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2.
164. Id.
165. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
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The Supreme Court requires three factors to be met to
establish Article III standing: (1) “the plaintiff must have
suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected
interest[,] which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b)
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”’”; (2)
“there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of,” meaning “the injury has to be
‘fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant’”;
and (3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”166
This three-part test requires a plaintiff to establish Article
III standing to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement
and thereby preserve the delicate balance of separation of
powers.167
Following the 2017 data breach, hundreds of class action
cases were filed against Equifax in federal and state court.168
In data breach class action cases, such as the cases Equifax
faces, plaintiffs allege that the defendant used inadequate
security to protect the plaintiffs’ personal data from being
hacked.169 In most cases, the plaintiff cannot prove that a
hacker has used or sold the data to the plaintiff’s
detriment.170 Accordingly, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant’s failure to protect his personal data has caused
him damage by increasing the risk of future harm from
identity theft and imposed costs on the plaintiff when he

3531.3 (3d ed. 2017); Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III
Standing: A Proposed Solution to the Serious (But Unrecognized) Separation of
Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2014).
166. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
167. REDISH & JOSHI, supra note 165, at 1375.
168. Equifax Inc: Still Defends Suits Over 2017 Data Breach, CLASS ACTION
REPORTER (Jan. 2, 2019); see generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (setting forth rules for
certifying class actions in federal courts).
169. MANK, supra note 8, at 1325. See also 3 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE &
INTERNET LAW § 27.07 (Dec. 2017 Update).
170. MANK, supra note 8, at 1325.
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takes measures to prevent future third-party data access.171
Accordingly, the Equifax class action cases will inevitably
turn on an analysis of whether the plaintiff’s increased risk
of future harm satisfies the “injury-in-fact” element of Article
III standing.172 As such, federal courts will have to decide
whether the victims of the Equifax data breach had an
“injury-in-fact” that was “actual or imminent” as well as
“concrete or particularized.”
Two recent court cases, Clapper v. Amnesty International
and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, have shaped the current legal
landscape in determining Article III standing in data breach
cases.173 The current circuit split surrounding the Article III
standing requirements stems from various circuit courts’
interpretation of these two cases. In Clapper, the Supreme
Court analyzed the “actual or imminent” requirement of
injury-in-fact for a data breach case,174 whereas Spokeo
analyzed whether a data breach case met the “concrete or
particularized” requirement for injury-in-fact.175

171. Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current
State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 399–400 (2014) (discussing
cases where “plaintiffs’ information has been accessed but that information has
not been used to open bank accounts, make unauthorized purchases, or otherwise
harm the plaintiffs. However, these plaintiffs typically claim that they have been
harmed in other ways: incurring costs for credit-monitoring services, paying the
costs of cancelling and receiving new bank cards, suffering loss of reward points
from cancelled cards, and enduring general anxiety that their information will be
used in the future to make unauthorized purchases.” (footnote omitted)).
172. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010);
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Sci.
Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14,
(D.D.C. 2014).
173. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016); Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 398 (2013).
174. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 398.
175. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 at 1545.
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1. Clapper: Injury must be “actual or imminent” for
standing
The Supreme Court analyzed the “actual or imminent”
requirement for Article III standing in a data breach case in
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA.176 Clapper originates from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which
“allows the Attorney General and Director of National
Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by
jointly authorizing the surveillance of individuals who are
not ‘United States persons’ and are reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States.”177 In 2008, the FISA
Amendments Act (50 U.S.C. § 1881a) made two key changes
to FISA that expanded the government’s power to authorize
foreign intelligence surveillance.178 The Clapper plaintiffs
are attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media
organizations, who claim that they engage in sensitive
international communications with individuals who they
believe are likely targets of § 1881a surveillance.179 These
plaintiffs subsequently sued on the day the FISA
amendments were enacted, seeking a declaration that the
§ 1881a is unconstitutional.
The Clapper case turns on whether plaintiffs suffered an
injury-in-fact and therefore have established Article III
standing.180 Plaintiffs claim that they have established an
injury-in-fact because “there is an objectively reasonable
likelihood that their communications with their foreign
contacts will be intercepted under § 1881a at some point in
176. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409.
177. Id. at 401.
178. Id. at 404 (First, “§ 1881a does not require the [g]overnment to
demonstrate probable cause that the target of the electronic surveillance is a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power.” Second, it “does not require the
government to specify the nature and location of each of the particular facilities
or places at which the electronic surveillance will occur.”).
179. Id. at 406.
180. See id. at 407.
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the future.”181 Justice Alito in his opinion for the Supreme
Court rejected this argument.182 The Court explained that
the plaintiffs’ argument for standing rests on a highly
speculative fear that relies on “a highly attenuated chain of
possibilities” and therefore does not satisfy the requirement
that threatened injury must be certainly pending.183
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan
dissented.184 In writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer stated
that the harm the plaintiffs claim is not speculative.185
Justice Breyer goes on to explain that based upon the record
and “commonsense inferences,” there is a very strong
likelihood that the government will intercept at least some
of the communications plaintiffs engage in while acting
under the authority of § 1881a.186 Justice Breyer gives four
strong reasons why the government will intercept some of
the communications in the future.187 Therefore, the dissent
concludes that there is a “high probability” that the
government will intercept plaintiffs’ communications and
the plaintiffs’ future harm is not at all speculative.188

181. Id. at 410.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009)
(rejecting a standing theory based on a speculative chain of possibilities);
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (reiterating that threatened
injury must be certainly impending to constitute an injury-in-fact).
184. Clapper, 586 U.S. at 422 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 427.
187. Id. at 427–29. First, the plaintiffs continue to engage in communication
that § 1881a authorizes the government to intercept. Second, plaintiffs have a
strong motive to engage in these conversations and the government has a strong
motive to listen in on these conversations. Third, the government’s past behavior
indicates that it will continue to seek information about alleged terrorists and
detainees “through means that include surveillance of electronic
communications.” “Fourth, the [g]overnment has the capacity to conduct
surveillance of the kind at issue here.”
188. Id. at 430–31.
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Addressing the majority’s reasoning that plaintiffs have
failed to show that injury is certainly impending, the dissent
argues that certainty is not and has never been the
“touchstone of standing.”189 The dissent explains that the
future is uncertain and all that is needed to support standing
is that future injury is reasonably likely.190 Therefore,
Justice Breyer concludes his dissent by stating that the word
“certainly” in “certainly impending” does not mean absolute
certainty. Rather, the Constitution requires something more
akin to reasonable probability or high probability to establish
an injury-in-fact.191
In footnote 5 of the opinion, the majority acknowledged
that an allegation of future injury can satisfy the immanency
requirement if the threatened injury is “certainly
impending,” or there is a “substantial risk” that harm will
occur.192 However, the majority ultimately held that
plaintiffs did not establish that injury is certainly impending
or that there was a substantial risk that harm will occur
because plaintiffs relied only on a speculative chain of
possibilities for injury to occur.193 Therefore, in a close 5-4
decision, the Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs lacked
“Article III standing because they cannot demonstrate that
the future injury that they purportedly fear is certainly
impending.”194 The result of Clapper’s close 5-4 decision,
along with the “substantial risk” theory in footnote 5 and
Justice Breyer’s strong dissent, has led to some lower courts
applying the alternative substantial risk standard for Article

189. Id. at 431.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 441.
192. Id. at 414, n.5 (majority opinion). See also, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 141 (2010); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).
193. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414.
194. Id. at 422.
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III standing.195
2. Spokeo: Injury Must be “Concrete and Particularized”
for Article III Standing
The Supreme Court recently explained the concrete and
particularized standard to establish an injury-in-fact for
Article III standing in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins.196 This case
arose from the search engine Spokeo conducting a search on
plaintiff Robins’ name and the website gathered and
disseminated inaccurate information about the plaintiff.197
After Robins discovered that inaccurate information about
him was distributed, he filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself
and a class of similarly situated people.198 Robins alleged
that Spokeo willfully failed to comply with Section 1681e(b)
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which requires
consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
consumer reports.”199
The Ninth Circuit held that defendant’s violation of the
FCRA was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
for Article III standing, even though the plaintiff failed to
allege any specific damages.200 The Supreme Court then
granted a writ of certiorari and analyzed the “concrete and
particularized” requirement for an injury-in-fact to satisfy
195. See In re Zappos, Inc., 2018 WL 1883212 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that
plaintiffs established that there is a “substantial risk that harm will occur” to
satisfy Article III standing); Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d
193, 200 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing the substantial risk test from Clapper and
ultimately holding that injury was too speculative to establish standing); Hedges
v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 196, 201–03 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing and applying the
substantial risk test for pre-enforcement review of criminal charges under
Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012).
196. Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2010).
200. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014).
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the first element of Article III standing.201 The Court
explained that for an injury to be particularized an
individual must have been injured in a “personal and
individual way.”202 Injury-in-fact must also be concrete.203
However, the Ninth Circuit did not analyze the concreteness
requirement. Rather, the Ninth Circuit held that Robins
alleges concrete de facto injuries because he alleges a
violation of his own statutory rights, meaning his personal
interests in the handling of his credit information is
individualized rather than collective.204 Writing for the
Supreme Court, Justice Alito rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
explanation. Justice Alito explained that Robins’ alleged
concrete de facto injuries concern only whether the injury is
particularized and not whether it is concrete.205 An injury
must be real, not abstract, for it to satisfy the concreteness
requirement for Article III standing.206 The majority opinion
in Spokeo did not define what exactly constitutes a concrete
injury. However, citing Clapper, the Court did acknowledge
that the “risk of real harm” can satisfy the concreteness
requirement.207 The Court explained that a tort claim can
exist even if it is difficult to measure or prove.208 Even with
the risk of real harm analysis, the Supreme Court was not
moved to hold that Robins had satisfied the concreteness
requirement.209
201. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016).
202. Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, n.1
(2016)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1549.
208. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569, 570 (AM. LAW INS.
1979), which states that slander per se and libel can be established without
special harm).
209. See id. at 1550.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis regarding standing in Spokeo was
incomplete because it failed to address the question of
whether Robins’ injury met the concreteness requirement for
Article III standing.210 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case
for further proceedings.211 As a result, the Supreme Court’s
failure to provide specific guidance on the concreteness
requirement in Spokeo has left lower courts and attorneys
struggling to understand what constitutes a concrete
injury.212 Ultimately, the Spokeo decision leaves open the
question of whether a data breach without financial losses
and only increased risk of future harm can constitute a
concrete injury for Article III standing.213
3. Circuit Split: Standing in a Data Breach Case
Following the Supreme Court’s rulings in Clapper and
Spokeo, circuit courts have been split on the issue of standing
in a data breach case. Multiple courts have held that
exposure of consumer data that elevates the risk of identity
theft is sufficient to establish Article III standing.214 Other
circuits have held that elevated risk of identity theft is
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Amy Howe, Opinion analysis: Case on standing and concrete harm
returns to the Ninth Circuit, at least for now, SCOTUSBLOG (May 16, 2016, 6:45
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/opinion-analysis-case-on-standing-andconcrete-harm-returns-to-the-ninth-circuit-at-least-for-now/.
The
author
discusses how Spokeo, its supporters, and its lawyers were hoping for a “brightline” rule, but instead were given a broader ruling in their favor. However, this
may lead to a more definitive answer on this issue in the near future from the
Supreme Court.
213. Mank, supra note 8, at 1356.
214. See Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2018); In
re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018); Attias v. CareFirst Inc.,
865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F.
App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC 794 F.3d 688,
690 (7th Cir. 2015).
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insufficient to establish standing.215 The majority of these
cases hinge on whether the injury is “actual or imminent”
and “concrete or particularized” to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement for Article III standing.
a. Circuit Courts Holding No Standing for Increased Risk of
Future Harm
i. Second Circuit: Whalen v. Michael Stores, Inc.
In Whalen v. Michael Stores, Inc., the Second Circuit
held that Plaintiff Mary Jane Whalen did not satisfy Article
III standing because she did not allege a particularized and
concrete injury.216 Ms. Whalen’s personal information was
stolen in the Michaels Stores, Inc. 2014 data breach.217
Although Ms. Whalen’s credit card information was used to
make fraudulent purchases, she subsequently canceled her
card and was not liable for her fraudulent purchases.218
Ms. Whalen claimed, inter alia, that she faces a risk of
future identity fraud.219 However, the Second Circuit
rejected Ms. Whalen’s claims because she did not suffer a
“particular and concrete injury” to satisfy the constitutional
standing requirements under Article III.220 Ms. Whalen did
not offer how she could plausibly face a threat of future fraud
because her stolen credit card was promptly canceled after
the breach and no other personal information was stolen in
the breach.221 Therefore, following the Supreme Court’s

215. See Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613 (4th
Cir. 2018); Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017); Beck v.
McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,
689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017);
216. See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017).
217. Id. at 90.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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ruling in Clapper, the Second Circuit explained that Ms.
Whalen did not allege a future injury that is “certainly
impending” to establish Article III standing.222 Accordingly,
the Second Circuit held that Ms. Whalen did not suffer an
injury-in-fact to satisfy the constitutional standing
requirements and her claims were dismissed.223
ii. Eighth Circuit: Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc.
In this case, defendants operated a chain of retail grocery
stores that suffered two separate cybersecurity breaches,
which exposed customer credit and debit card information.224
Subsequently, plaintiffs sued as a class and argued that they
sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact because the theft of
their card information created a substantial risk that they
would suffer identity theft in the future.225
Plaintiffs relied on a 2007 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report to support their claim that the breach
created a substantial risk of future harm. 226 However, the
Eighth Circuit found that this report actually did not support
their claim.227 The Court stated that the GAO report
concluded that compromised credit and debit card
information could not be used alone to open new
unauthorized accounts.228 Additionally, the report found that
most of the data breaches from 2000 to 2005 have not
resulted in detected incidents of identity theft.229 In light of
this information, combined with the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Clapper, the Eighth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs are
222. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013)).
223. Id.
224. See Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017).
225. Id. at 768.
226. Id. at 771.
227. Id.
228. Id. (quoting U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-07-737).
229. Id.
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not at substantial risk of identity theft and plaintiffs’
allegations of future injury do not support standing in this
case.230
iii. Fourth Circuit: Beck v. McDonald & Hutton v.
National Board of Examiners in Optometry, Inc.
Beck v. McDonald
This 2017 Fourth Circuit case stems from a laptop
connected to a pulmonary functioning testing device that was
stolen from a Veterans Affairs hospital.231 This laptop
contained encrypted personal information of approximately
7,400 patients.232 A class action case was subsequently filed
and plaintiffs sought to establish Article III standing based
on the increased risk of future identity theft and the cost of
measures to protect against it.233
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the threat of
future
injury
can
satisfy
Article
III
standing
234
requirements.
However, the Court held that the threat
faced by the plaintiffs here was too speculative to establish
standing.235 The Fourth Circuit explained that, absent
factual evidence, the assumption that the thieves stole the
laptop and that the named plaintiffs would have their
personal information stolen is much too speculative to
establish standing.236 Additionally, citing footnote 5 in
230. See id. at 771–72 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398
(2013) (“[A]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.”)).
231. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017).
232. Id. at 267. The information in the stolen laptop included birth dates, the
last four digits of social security numbers, and physical descriptions of patients.
233. Id. at 266–67.
234. Id. at 271 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000)).
235. Id. at 274–75.
236. Id. at 274 (“[E]ven after extensive discovery, the Beck plaintiffs have
uncovered no evidence that the information contained on the stolen laptop has
been accessed or misused or that they have suffered identity theft, nor, for that
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Clapper, the Fourth Circuit held that, in this case, standing
cannot be established from the “substantial risk” that the
harm from identity theft will occur.237 The Court rejected
Plaintiffs’ argument that because, overall, 33% of healthrelated data breaches result in identity theft, they are at a
substantial risk of harm to establish standing.238 Finally, the
Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the future
mitigation costs to guard against identity theft do not
establish standing.239 Therefore, following the ruling in
Clapper, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling to dismiss the case for lack of standing under Article
III.240
Hutton v. National Board of Examiners in Optometry, Inc.
In June of 2018, the Fourth Circuit held that Plaintiffs’
established standing in a data breach case, but not on the
basis of increased risk of future harm.241 In Hutton, a class
comprised of optometrists sued the National Board of
Examiners in Optometry (NBEO) for injuries resulting from
a data breach at NBEO.242 The district court, citing Beck,
matter, that the thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private
information.”).
237. Id. at 275.
238. Id. at 275–76 (“Even if we credit the Plaintiffs’ allegation that 33% of those
affected by Dorn VAMC data breaches will become victims of identity theft, it
follows that over 66% of veterans affected will suffer no harm. This statistic falls
far short of establishing a ‘substantial risk’ of harm.”) (citing Khan v. Children’s
Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 (D. Md. 2016) stating ‘general
allegations . . . that data breach victims are 9.5 times more likely to suffer
identity theft and that 19 percent of data breach victims become victims of
identity theft’ insufficient to establish ‘substantial risk’ of harm.”).
239. Id. at 276–77 (“Simply put, these self-imposed harms cannot confer
standing.”) (citing Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th
Cir. 2015) “Mitigation expenses do not qualify as actual injuries where the harm
is not imminent.”).
240. Id. at 278.
241. See Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, Inc. 892 F.3d 613, 617
(4th Cir. 2018).
242. Id. at 617.
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held that plaintiffs were not injured because they had not
incurred fraudulent charges nor been denied credit.
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the Hutton case
because plaintiffs failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement to establish standing.243 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs
suffered no injury.244 The circuit court reasoned that
plaintiffs had been concretely injured because hackers had
used, or attempted to use, the plaintiffs’ personal
information to open fraudulent accounts.245 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit in Hutton reversed the district court’s ruling
and held that plaintiffs’ suffered an injury-in-fact to
establish Article III standing.246
With the Beck and Hutton cases in the past two years,
the Fourth Circuit has struck a middle ground on the issue
of standing in data breach cases.247 The Fourth Circuit
distinguished Hutton from Beck by emphasizing that the
Hutton plaintiffs were “concretely injured” when accounts
were opened in their name, even though fraudulent charges
had not occurred. On the other hand, the Beck plaintiffs did
not have any concrete injury in which their personal

243. Id. at 618–19.
244. See id. at 622.
245. Id. (“By way of example, the Hutton Complaint specifies that Hutton
received an unsolicited Chase Amazon Visa credit card that was applied for using
her social security number and her maiden name (the name that she had
provided to the NBEO in 1998). Around the same time, Kaeochinda [a coplaintiff] learned that someone had applied for a Chase credit card using her
social security number and former married name. Mizrahi [a co-plaintiff] also
actually received an alert that her credit score had decreased eleven points due
to a credit application that was fraudulently filed with Chase, using her address,
social security number, and mother’s maiden name.”).
246. Id.
247. Kevin M. McGinty, Fourth Circuit Decision Seizes Middle Ground on the
Issue of Standing in Data Breach Cases, THE NAT’L L. REV. (June 20, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fourth-circuit-decision-seizes-middleground-issue-standing-data-breach-cases.

1180

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

information was misused.248 Thus, the Fourth Circuit falls in
the middle on the standing issue, allowing standing for
plaintiffs that suffer misuse of their stolen personal
information, but rejecting standing for plaintiffs with an
increased risk of future harm after a data breach.249
b. Circuit Courts Holding Standing for Increased Risk of
Future Harm
i. D.C. Circuit: Attias v. CareFirst, Inc.
In 2015 defendant CareFirst, Inc., a group of health
insurance companies, experienced a data breach when an
intruder breached twenty-two of its computers containing its
customers’ personal information.250 Subsequently, seven
CareFirst customers brought a class action against
CareFirst, Inc.251 Plaintiffs alleged that the data breach
exposed them to a heightened risk of identity theft, and
therefore plaintiffs’ increased risk of future injury is
substantial enough to create Article III standing.252
Following the district court’s holding that plaintiffs’
theory of injury was too speculative to establish standing, the
D.C. Circuit reviewed this holding de novo.253 The D.C.
Circuit explained that the main question is whether
plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleges that the plaintiffs now
face a substantial risk of identity theft as a result of
248. Gavejian & Lazzarotti, supra note 113.
249. McGinty, supra note 247 (“Hutton reinforces the Fourth Circuit stance
that misuse must accompany the compromise of personal data, but departs from
other circuits requiring misuse in that there need not be any pecuniary loss for
the misuse to confer standing. The inconvenience of having to rectify fraudulent
credit card accounts was deemed sufficient injury to trigger standing. This
signals further development of the standing issue in the lower courts which could,
over time, influence the Supreme Court to agree to weigh in on this question.”).
250. See Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
251. Id. at 623.
252. Id. at 626.
253. Id. at 625.
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CareFirst’s alleged negligence in the data breach.254 Here,
CareFirst collects and stores credit card and social security
numbers, as well as other personal identification, and
personal healthcare information as part of its business.255
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that combinations of members’
names, birth dates, email addresses, and subscriber
identification numbers alone qualifies as personal
information, and the unauthorized access to the combination
of this information creates a material risk of identity theft
for plaintiffs.256 For example, a cybercriminal could
impersonate a victim and obtain medical services in her
name, leading to inaccuracies in the victim’s medical records,
which can cause a host of problems for the victim.257 The D.C.
Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and held that this
constitutes a plausible allegation that plaintiffs face a
substantial risk of identity fraud, “even if their social
security numbers were never exposed to the data thief.”258
The D.C. Circuit also clearly distinguished this case from
Clapper, explaining that in Clapper the plaintiff’s harm
could only occur through a series of contingent events, none
of which were alleged to have occurred at the time of the
lawsuit.259 Whereas here, the cybercriminals have already
accessed personal identifying data on CareFirst’s servers
and it is much less speculative to infer that the
cybercriminals have the intent and ability to use the data to

254. Id. at 627.
255. Id. at 627–28.
256. Complaint at 8, Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No.
1:15-cv-00882-CRC).
257. Id. For example, it can lead to a victim having inaccuracies in his or her
medical record which can cause the victim to receive improper medical care, have
his or her medical insurance depleted, become disqualified for health or life
insurance, or even become disqualified for some jobs.
258. Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
259. Id.
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harm the victims of the breach.260 Thus, the risk to plaintiffs
here is not based on a long sequence of uncertain certainties;
rather, a much more substantial risk than the risk presented
to the Clapper court exists.261 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit
held that the claim by the Attias plaintiffs satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing.262
ii. Sixth Circuit: Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
In this case, cybercriminals breached Nationwide’s263
computer network and stole its customers’ personal
information.264 Following the breach, plaintiffs Mohammad
Galaria and Anthony Hancox brought a putative class action
suit.265 The stolen information included names, dates of
birth, marital statuses, genders, occupations, employers,
Social Security numbers, and driver’s license numbers.266
The plaintiffs here allege that the theft of their personal
data places them at a continuing, increased risk of fraud and
identity theft.267 Plaintiffs further argue that the risk of
harm they face is more than the speculative allegations of
“possible future injury” or “objectively reasonable likelihood”
that the Supreme Court rejected in Clapper.268 The Sixth

260. Id.
261. Id. at 629.
262. Id.
263. Nationwide is an insurance and financial services company that
maintains records containing sensitive personal information about its customers,
as well as potential customers who submit their information to obtain quotes for
insurance products. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384,
386 (6th Cir. 2016).
264. Galaria, 663 Fed. App’x at 386 (“On October 3, 2012, hackers broke into
Nationwide’s computer network and stole the personal information of Plaintiffs
and 1.1 million others.”).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 388.
268. Id.
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Circuit acknowledges that it is not certain that plaintiffs’
data will be misused, however, the increased risk of future
harm made it reasonable for plaintiffs to incur mitigation
costs.269 Plaintiffs must expend time and money to monitor
their credit, check their bank statements, and modify their
financial accounts.270 For that reason, this is not a case
where plaintiffs are manufacturing standing by incurring
costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.271 Rather, the
plaintiffs suffered concrete injuries to mitigate imminent
harm from the data breach.272 Therefore, following this
reasoning, the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs have suffered
a concrete injury and satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement
for Article III standing.273
iii. Seventh Circuit: Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group
and Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group
In 2013, cybercriminals hacked Neiman Marcus, a
luxury department store, and stole its customers’ credit card
numbers.274 Following the breach, Hilary Remijas and
269. Id. (“Thus, although it might not be ‘literally certain’ that Plaintiffs’ data
will be misused, there is a sufficiently substantial risk of harm that incurring
mitigation costs is reasonable. Where Plaintiffs already know that they have lost
control of their data, it would be unreasonable to expect Plaintiffs to wait for
actual misuse—a fraudulent charge on a credit card, for example—before taking
steps to ensure their own personal and financial security, particularly when
Nationwide recommended taking these steps.” (citing footnote 5 of Clapper v.
Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (citations omitted)).
270. Id. Nationwide offered to provide some of these monitoring services for a
limited time, but plaintiffs’ risk is continuing and they have incurred costs to
continue to protect themselves from identity theft. These continued mitigating
efforts are needed because following a data breach a reasonable inference can be
drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data for fraudulent purposes at some
point in the future.
271. Id. at 389.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir.
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several others filed complaints against Neiman Marcus and
a subsequent class action lawsuit was filed.275 Following the
district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing, the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the ruling de novo.276
Plaintiffs claim two imminent injuries: (1) increased risk
of fraudulent charges and (2) greater susceptibility to
identity theft.277 Citing Clapper, the Seventh Circuit
explains that plaintiffs can establish standing for future
harm if it is certainly impending.278 Further, a substantial
risk that future injury will occur can establish standing in a
data breach case.279 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that it is plausible to infer that plaintiffs have
shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus
data breach.280 The Seventh Circuit explained stating, “why
else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal
consumers’ private information? Presumably, the purpose of
the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or
assume those consumers’ identities.”281 Plaintiffs also claim
that they lost time and money protecting themselves from
identity theft and fraudulent charges. In addressing this
claim, the Seventh Circuit explains that mitigation expenses
do not qualify as actual injuries where the harm is not
imminent.282 The Court explains that credit monitoring
2015). Neiman Marcus notified the public of the breach on January 10, 2014,
stating that 350,000 credit cards had been exposed to the hackers’ malware and
9,200 of those 350,000 credit cards were known to have been fraudulently used.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 691.
277. Id. at 692.
278. Id. (Allegations of future harm can establish Article III standing if that
harm is “certainly impending,” but “allegations of possible future injury are not
sufficient.” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013))).
279. Id. at 693.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 694 (citing Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1152).

2019]

EQUIFAX DATA BREACH

1185

services come at a price that is more than de minimus283 and
therefore qualifies as a concrete injury.284 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs’ injuries associated with
resolving fraudulent charges and protection against future
identity theft constitute an injury-in-fact under Article III
standing requirements.285
Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.
Dieffenbach stems from a 2012 Barnes & Noble data
breach where hackers stole customers’ personal
information.286 The district court first addressed the
standing issue in this case.287 Citing Remijas, the district
court held that the Dieffenbach plaintiffs satisfied the
standing requirement, based on allegations of future
substantial risk of identity theft and plaintiffs’ lost time and
money spent to protect against identity theft.288 Defendants
subsequently appealed to the Seventh Circuit arguing that
the case should be dismissed for failing to adequately plead
damages.289
In addressing the issue on appeal regarding damages,
the Seventh Circuit also reaffirmed its position on standing
in this case. The Court stated that “[t]o say that the plaintiffs
have standing is to say that they have alleged injury in fact,
and if they have suffered an injury then damages are

283. See, e.g., EXPERIAN CREDIT MONITORING, supra note 110. Experian credit
monitoring costs $4.99 for the first month and then $24.99 for the months
following.
284. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694.
285. Id. at 695.
286. Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2018)
([Cybercriminals] acquired details such as customers’ names, card numbers and
expiration dates, and PINs.”).
287. See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137078
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2016).
288. See id. at *9–*11.
289. Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2018).
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available[.]”290 The Court explained further that plaintiffs
have standing on three bases: (1) plaintiffs may have
suffered injury from having to pay for credit monitoring
services; (2) unauthorized withdrawals that may have
caused a loss (the time value of money)291 even if the bank
later restored the principal; or (3) from opportunity cost
when an individual has to use his own time to monitor and
correct his bank accounts.292 The Seventh Circuit concluded
that these three injuries establish standing and also justify
monetary damages.
iv. Ninth Circuit: In re Zappos.com, Inc.
In January of 2012 online retailer Zappos.com, Inc.
experienced a data breach, where hackers stole the personal
information of over 24 million Zappos customers. 293 The
plaintiffs in this appeal sued and claimed they established
standing based on an increased risk of future identity theft,
even though plaintiffs have not alleged instances of actual
identity theft or fraud.294
The Ninth Circuit evaluated Zappos in light of its
previous ruling in the 2010 case Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.
and the 2013 Supreme Court ruling in Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA. In Krottner, a thief stole a laptop containing

290. Id.
291. See Mankiw, supra note 110 at 564–65 (explaining the time value of
money, of which, at its core, the lesson is that “money today is more valuable than
the same amount of money in the future.” Therefore, if an individual suffers a
fraudulent withdrawal at a bank due to a data breach, if the bank simply restores
the account back to its original balance, the individual has lost the amount of
interest that could have accrued on the balance due to the time value of money.).
292. Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2018).
293. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018)
(Cybercriminals “stole the names, account numbers, passwords, email addresses,
billing and shipping addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card
information[.]”).
294. See id. at 1024.
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personal information of 97,000 Starbucks employees.295 The
Krottner plaintiffs sued, and their only harm to establish
standing was an increased risk of future identity theft.296
The Ninth Circuit in Krottner held that this increased risk of
future harm was sufficient to establish standing because,
with their personally identifiable information in the hands of
a hacker, plaintiffs had alleged a credible threat of real and
immediate harm.297 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that
Krottner is distinguishable from Clapper and subsequently
followed the reasoning in Krottner in this case.298 Unlike
Clapper, the plaintiffs’ injuries in Krottner and Zappos do not
require a speculative multi-chain link of inferences.299
Rather, here in Zappos, hackers have the means to commit
identity theft with plaintiffs’ stolen personal information.300
Therefore, following the ruling in Krottner, the Ninth Circuit
held that plaintiffs’ increased risk of future identity theft
established Article III standing.301
B. The Current Privacy Law Landscape
The second area of unsettled law surrounding data
breaches is the current privacy law landscape. As stated

295. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).
296. Id. at 1142.
297. Id. at 1143.
298. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d at 1126.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1127 (“Although there is no allegation in this case that the stolen
information included social security numbers, as there was in Krottner, the
information taken in the data breach still gave hackers the means to commit
fraud or identity theft, as Zappos itself effectively acknowledged by urging
affected customers to change their passwords on any other account where they
may have used “the same or a similar password.” (citation omitted)). See also, id.
at 1128–29 (“Plaintiffs also specifically allege that ‘[a] person whose PII has been
obtained and compromised may not see the full extent of identity theft or identity
fraud for years.’ And ‘it may take some time for the victim to become aware of the
theft.’”).
301. Id. at 1128.
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previously, there are fifty separate data breach notification
statutes, all with varying degrees of severity.302 In addition
to these notification statutes, two significant privacy laws
were enacted in the past year. These laws are: (1) the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)303 and (2) the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).304 These laws
have a significant impact on organizations and individuals
throughout the world. As U.S. citizens and lawmakers begin
to realize the gravity of security breaches, these two laws will
provide an example for the U.S. Congress and pave the way
for a uniform federal privacy law.
1. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
The world’s strongest data protection rules were passed
into law when the General Data Protection Regulation was
adopted by the European Parliament and the European
Council in April 2016.305 Following the ratification of the
GDPR, there was a two-year transition period to allow
organizations to adapt to the new rule and change their
methods, policies, procedures, and documentation to meet
the new requirements.306 Then, on May 25, 2018, the GDPR
came into full force and covered organizations are now
required to comply with the GDPR in its entirety or face
penalty.307
The GDPR intended to “harmonize” data privacy laws in

302. See supra pp. 1139–42 and accompanying notes.
303. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L119) [hereinafter GDPR].
304. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798
(2018) [hereinafter CCPA].
305. GDPR, supra note 303. See also Matt Burgess, What is GDPR? The
Summary Guide to GDPR Compliance in the UK, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eu-legislation-compliancesummary-fines-2018.
306. BALLON, supra note 169, at § 26.04[18][A].
307. See Francoise Gilbert, Global Privacy and Security Law, Ch. 6A “EU Data
Protection Regulation” (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business Publishing).
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Europe as well as protect and empower all EU citizens’ data
privacy.308 The GDPR advanced these intentions by creating
eight rights for individuals regarding personal information
security.309 The most notable rights created are the right to
be forgotten, which allows an individual to have its personal
information removed from an organization; the right to
access, which gives individuals the right to know exactly
what information is held about them and how it is processed;
and the right to be informed, which requires all
organizations to be completely transparent in how they are
using personal data.310 Outside of the eight individual rights,
the GDPR also protects individuals by requiring all
companies that collect or process EU citizens’ personal data
to appoint a data protection officer.311 The data protection
officer at each company is responsible for overseeing the data
protection strategy and implementation to ensure
compliance with GDPR requirements.312
308. EU GDPR, https://eugdpr.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
309. INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-dataprotection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individualrights/ (visited Feb. 24, 2019) (These eight rights for individuals include: (1) the
right to be informed; (2) the right of access; (3) the right to rectification; (4) the
right to erasure; (5) the right to restrict processing; (6) the right to data
portability; (7) the right to object; (8) rights in relation to automated decision
making and profiling.).
310. See id.
311. GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 37.
312. Nate Lord, What is a Data Protection Officer (DPO)? Learn About the New
Role Required for GDPR Compliance in 2019, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-data-protection-officer-dpo-learn-aboutnew-role-required-gdpr-compliance. The data protection officer’s responsibilities
include, but are not limited to, the following:
Educating the company and employees on important compliance
requirements;
Training staff involved in data processing;
Conducting audits to ensure compliance and address potential issues
proactively;
Serving as the point of contact between the company and GDPR
Supervisory Authorities;
Monitoring performance and providing advice on the impact of data
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Arguably, the most significant regulation from the
GDPR is the high standard it created for notifying
individuals after a breach. The GDPR requires an
organization to notify the relevant regulator within seventytwo hours of discovering the data breach.313 This notification
must include a description of the nature of the breach, the
estimated impact of the breach, the name and details of the
data protection officer, and a description of the measures
taken by the organization to address the breach.314 Finally,
noncompliance with any of the GDPR regulations will result
in significant fines.315 The GDPR fines are a tiered system
with lower tier fines of €10 million or 2% of annual revenues,
whichever is greater, for noncompliance of Articles 8, 11, 25–
39, and 41–43.316 The higher tiered fines are €20 million or
protection efforts;
Maintaining comprehensive records of all data processing activities
conducted by the company, including the purpose of all processing
activities, which must be made public on request.
Id.; see also GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 37.
313. GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 33(1). (“In the case of a personal data
breach, the controller shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later
than 72 hours after having become aware of it, notify the personal data breach to
the supervisory authority competent in accordance with Article 55, unless the
personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of
natural persons. Where the notification to the supervisory authority is not made
within 72 hours, it shall be accompanied by reasons for the delay.”).
314. GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 33(3).
The notification referred to in paragraph 1 shall at least:
1. describe the nature of the personal data breach including where
possible, the categories and approximate number of data subjects
concerned and the categories and approximate number of personal data
records concerned;
2. communicate the name and contact details of the data protection
officer or other contact point where more information can be obtained;
3. describe the likely consequences of the personal data breach;
4. describe the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller
to address the personal data breach, including, where appropriate,
measures to mitigate its possible adverse effects.
Id.
315. See GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 83.
316. See id. at art. 83(4). (“Infringements of the following provisions shall, in
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4% of annual revenues, whichever is greater, for
noncompliance of Articles 5, 6, 7, 9, 12–22, and 44–49.317 As
a result, these fines create a large incentive for companies to
stay diligent and comply with all GDPR regulations.
Although the GDPR has significantly increased
protection for individuals and their personal information, it
is not perfect nor without criticism.318 One criticism of the
GDPR is that it does not even achieve its goal of harmonizing
all of the data protection laws in the EU.319 Of the sixty-five
articles that relate to the rights of data subjects, thirty of
them allow member states to engage in variation from the
standard set in the GDPR.320 Accordingly, there is the
potential that multiple member states will deviate from the
norm and thereby destroy the harmonization of all data

accordance with paragraph 2, be subject to administrative fines up to 10,000,000
EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2% of the total worldwide annual
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher: (a) the obligations
of the controller and the processor pursuant to Articles 8, 11, 25 to 39 and 42 and
43; (b) the obligations of the certification body pursuant to Articles 42 and 43; (c)
the obligations of the monitoring body pursuant to Article 41(4).”).
317. See id. at art. 83(5). (“Infringements of the following provisions shall, in
accordance with paragraph 2, be subject to administrative fines up to 20,000,000
EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher: (a) the basic
principles for processing, including conditions for consent, pursuant to Articles 5,
6, 7 and 9; (b) the data subjects’ rights pursuant to Articles 12 to 22; (c) the
transfers of personal data to a recipient in a third country or an international
organization pursuant to Articles 44 to 49; (d) any obligations pursuant to
Member State law adopted under Chapter IX; (e) non-compliance with an order
or a temporary or definitive limitation on processing or the suspension of data
flows by the supervisory authority pursuant to Article 58(2) or failure to provide
access in violation of Article 58(1).”).
318. David Bender, GDPR Harmonization: Reality or Myth?, IAPP: PRIVACY
PERSPECTIVES (June 7, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-harmonizationreality-or-myth/.
319. See id.; see also Katie Nolan, GDPR: Harmonization or Fragmentation?
Applicable Law Problems in EU Data Protection Law, Berkeley TECH. L. J. BLOG
(Jan. 20, 2018), http://btlj.org/2018/01/gdpr-harmonization-or-fragmentationapplicable-law-problems-in-eu-data-protection-law/.
320. Bender, supra note 318.
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protection laws in the EU.321 As a result, the GDPR will not
achieve its goal of having a “single set of rules” allowing
businesses to save costs on compliance.322 Just the opposite
has occurred. Therefore, the GDPR will not achieve
harmonization if member states continue to deviate, thereby
making compliance more burdensome and costly for
businesses.323
The GDPR’s failure to achieve harmonization adds to the
already concerning problem that GDPR compliance is too
burdensome on organizations and the extremely costly
penalties will have detrimental consequences on business.324
321. Id. (“National legislation is needed to select among the variations
permitted in the GDPR itself. At this writing, only a minority of member states
have enacted this implementing legislation—although all 28 were to have it in
place by May 25, 2018—and some others have draft legislation. We do not yet
know the degree of diversity that will actually be introduced by selecting
variations, but the potential for diversity is great. After all, the fact that a
diversion from the norm is included in a particular article suggests that there
may have been at least one member state that lobbied for it.”).
322. Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules
to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses, European
Commission Press Release IP/12/46 (Jan. 25, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-12-46_en.htm (This 2012 proposal aimed for the GDPR to be a “single
law [that] will do away with the current fragmentation and costly administrative
burdens, leading to savings for businesses of around €2.3 billion a year.”).
323. See Nolan, supra note 319 (arguing that in the future national data
protection laws will continue to diverge). (“The EU legislature’s aim to create a
single set of rules has not come to fruition. While there is a great deal more
convergence on the substance of EU data protection law compared to under the
Data Protection Directive, it is by no means a complete harmonization. The
practical reality is that national data protection laws will continue to diverge.
While a complex co-operation and consistency mechanism has been designed to
determine the division of responsibilities between data protection authorities, the
GDPR is silent as to when the national data protection legislation will apply. In
the absence of any applicable law rule, organizations will face considerable
uncertainty as to their legal obligations.”).
324. See Larry Downes, GDPR and the End of the Internet’s Grand Bargain,
HARV. BUS. REV. (April 9, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/gdpr-and-the-end-of-theinternets-grand-bargain; Daphne Keller, The New, Worse ‘Right to be Forgotten’,
POLITICO EU (Jan. 27, 2016 7:28 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/right-to-beforgotten-google-defense-data-protection-privacy/ (Daphne Keller, former
associate general counsel at Google criticizes the “right to be forgotten.”); see also
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Many in the technology industry fear that the GDPR’s strict
regulations could push small and medium-sized competitors
out of the industry.325 This is because companies spent
hundreds of hours becoming compliant with the GDPR,
costing many companies over $1 million dollars.326
Accordingly, compliance alone is extremely time-consuming
and costly for small and medium-sized businesses.327 Then,
if a company slips up and is found non-compliant, it will face
an enormous fine under Article 83.328 In sum, this time and
money spent on compliance with the GDPR takes away
valuable resources that a company could be using to grow its
business. Therefore, it is a legitimate and well-founded fear
that the GDPR’s strict regulations could cause small and

In GDPR Compliance, U.S. Companies Lag Behind United Kingdom, EU, CORP.
COUNSEL (July 12, 2018) (criticizing the cost of complying with the GDPR).
325. Caroline Spiezio, An American GDPR? Companies’ Privacy Gurus Discuss
Future Federal Data Law in DC, CORP. COUNSEL (Sept. 26, 2018 3:57 PM),
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/09/26/an-american-gdpr-companiesprivacy-gurus-discuss-future-federal-data-law-in-d-c/.
326. See id. (quoting Google’s chief privacy officer Keith Enright stating that
“Google’s preparations for GDPR had taken ‘hundreds of years of human time,’
time smaller companies may not have to spare.”); see also Dan Clark, In GDPR
Compliance, US Companies Lag Behind United Kingdom, EU, CORP. COUNSEL
(July 12, 2018 1:23 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/07/12/in-gdprcompliance-u-s-companies-lag-behind-united-kingdom-eu/ (“Twenty-five percent
of U.S. respondents spent over $1 million on becoming compliant with the
GDPR.”).
327. See Spiezio, supra note 325. See also Hearing on Protecting Consumer
Privacy in the Era of Big Data Before the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce
and S. Comm. On Consumer Protection and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement by Roslyn Layton, Visiting Scholar, THE AM. ENTER. INST.) (“There is
little to no data that shows that small to medium sized companies are growing in
the EU as a result of the regulation. The European Commission’s Digital
Scoreboard reports shows a consistent lag in the SME [small to medium
enterprise] segment, particularly to modernize their websites and market outside
their own EU countries. One study suggests that small- and medium-sized ad
tech competitors have lost up to one-third of their market position since the
GDPR took effect. [ . . . ] The GDPR is a barrier to market entry that punishes
small firms, rewards large ones, and creates a cozy relationship between
regulators and the firms they regulate.” (footnotes omitted)).
328. See GDPR, supra note 303, at art. 83.
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medium-sized businesses to fail.
2. The California Consumer Privacy Act
Following the lead of the EU’s GDPR, California enacted
the most comprehensive privacy law in the United States
when it passed the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)
in June 2018.329 The law does not go into effect until January
1, 2020, which allows companies to adapt to the changes in
the law.330 Similar to the GDPR, the CCPA creates new data
privacy rights for California consumers. These data privacy
rights include the rights to know, access, delete, and opt out
of the sale of personal information.331 Also similar to the
GDPR, the CCPA imposes penalties on companies that
violate the law. If a company is found in violation of the
CCPA, it will have thirty days to cure any violation after
being notified of the alleged noncompliance.332 Then, if a
company fails to cure any violation within thirty days, it can
face a civil penalty up to $7,500 for every intentional
violation.333 Additionally, the CCPA provides consumers a
private right of action that allows consumers, either
individually or as a class, to seek statutory or actual damages
and injunctive relief, if their personal information is subject
to unauthorized access.334
Unlike the GDPR, the CCPA does not apply to all
businesses in the United States, nor all the businesses in
California. First, the CCPA only applies to for-profit

329. CCPA, supra note 304.
330. See Mark G. McCreary, The California Consumer Privacy Act: What You
Need to Know, N. J. L. J. (Dec. 1, 2018 10:00 AM), https://www.law.com/njlaw
journal/2018/12/01/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-what-you-need-toknow/.
331. CCPA, supra note 304, at §§ 1798.100–1798.120.
332. Id. at § 1785.155.
333. Id. at § 1785.155.
334. Id. at § 1798.150.
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organizations that conduct business in California.335 Second,
for the CCPA to apply, an organization must satisfy at least
one of the following three criteria: (1) have an annual gross
revenue in excess of $25 million; (2) receive or disclose the
personal information of 50,000 or more California residents,
households or devices on an annual basis; or (3) derive fifty
percent or more of their annual revenues from selling
California residents’ personal information.336 Therefore, the
CCPA provides strict rules for large for-profit organizations
doing business in California but does not apply these rules to
small businesses or non-profit organizations.
Another difference between the GDPR and CCPA is that
the CCPA does not provide a data breach notification
requirement. Rather, the California legislature chose to
continue with its own data breach notification statute that
has been the law since 2003.337 This notification law requires
that an organization notify customers of a data breach and
specifically sets forth the manner in which an organization
is to notify those affected by the breach.338 However,

335. See McCreary, supra note 330.
336. CCPA, supra note 304, at § 1798.140(c).
337. See CAL. CIV. CODE 1798.82.
338. Id. at 1798.82(d).
A person or business that is required to issue a security breach
notification pursuant to this section shall meet all of the following
requirements:
(1) The security breach notification shall be written in plain language,
shall be titled “Notice of Data Breach,” and shall present the information
described in paragraph (2) under the following headings: “What
Happened,” “What Information Was Involved,” “What We Are Doing,”
“What You Can Do,” and “For More Information.” Additional
information may be provided as a supplement to the notice.
(A) The format of the notice shall be designed to call attention to the
nature and significance of the information it contains.
(B) The title and headings in the notice shall be clearly and
conspicuously displayed.
(C) The text of the notice and any other notice provided pursuant to this

1196

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

California’s data breach notification law does not provide a
time requirement to notify individuals of a data breach,
rather it simply requires disclosure “be made in the most
expedient time possible and without unreasonable
delay[.]”339 Therefore, the California legislature punted the
opportunity to clarify the required time for an organization
to notify individuals of a data breach.
The CCPA has been praised for providing better data
protection to California residents but also criticized by
businesses that will need to comply with the law.340 The main
concern is that the law is much too broad and ambiguous.
Namely, the CCPA’s definitions of “business” and “personal
information” are criticized.341 The CCPA’s definition of
“business” is a concern because, as presently written, the
CCPA could not only apply to organizations that sell
individuals’ data for financial gain but also any website that
collects IP addresses from millions of unique visitors each
day.342 Accordingly, this broad definition could pull in a
website that does not conduct business in California but
simply has a website that collects IP addresses from its
visitors in California. As a result, this will put an enormous
burden on these websites to comply with a law that they did
section shall be no smaller than 10-point type.
Id.
339. Id. at 1798.82(a).
340. Allison Grande, Don’t Water Down Calif. Privacy Law, Lawmakers Told,
LAW360 (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1108475/don-t-waterdown-calif-privacy-law-lawmakers-told (reporting that many advocacy groups
applaud the law for being a “privacy leader” in America). Whereas, others in
industry criticized portions of the law. Id. (“The California Chamber of Commerce
and other business groups from a range of industry sectors in August asked
lawmakers to rein in some of the more ‘unworkable’ aspects of the statute,
including its broad definition of personal information and its application to a wide
range of data uses.”).
341. See CCPA, supra note 304, at § 1785.140(c), (o).
342. Danny Allan, California’s New Data Privacy Law Could Begin a
Regulatory Disaster, FORTUNE (Oct. 23, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/10/23/
california-data-privacy-law-gdpr/.
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not foresee.
A concern greater than the CCPA’s definition of business
is the law’s enormously broad definition of “personal
information.”343 Under the CCPA’s definition of personal
information, the law is not limited to a company’s customers.
Essentially, if a company physically or virtually touches a
California resident, it will be subject to the CCPA.344 Under
the CCPA, the term “personal information” includes any
“information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable
of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked,
directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or
household.”345 This overly broad definition of personal
information includes any information that could be linked
with a person, which essentially is all information.346 This
makes the entire compliance with the CCPA very confusing
for American businesses. Although this broad definition was
intended to protect as much consumer personal information
as possible, it could actually “undermine important privacyprotective practices like encouraging companies to handle
data in a way that is not directly linked to a consumer’s
343. See CCPA, supra note 304, at § 1785.140(o).
344. See Landmark New Privacy Law in California to Challenge Businesses
Nationwide, JD SUPRA (July 5, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
landmark-new-privacy-law-in-california-99847/ (The CCPA encompasses all
California residents, including employees, customers, visitors to a company
internet site or business location, contractors and independent contractors, and
vendors.).
345. See CCPA, supra note 304, at § 1785.140(o)(1)(A); see also CCPA, supra
note 304, at § 1785.140(o)(1)(B)–(K) (Personal information under the CCPA
includes but is not limited to: records of personal property; products or services
purchased, obtained, or considered; other purchasing or consuming histories or
tendencies; biometric information; internet or other electronic network activity
information (e.g., browsing and search history, and information regarding an
individual’s interaction with a website, application, or advertisement);
geolocation data; and professional or employment-related information.).
346. Spiezio, supra note 325. (“CCPA’s definition of ‘personal information’ goes
beyond information that actually identifies a person to include any information
that ‘could be linked with a person,’ which arguably is all information.” (quoting
Amazon’s Vice President and Associate General Counsel Andrew Devore)).
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identity.”347 Therefore, the CCPA’s broad definition of
“personal information” will make compliance with the law
burdensome and costly, and potentially reduce data
protection for California residents.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: SUPREME COURT ADDRESSING
CIRCUIT SPLIT AND A FEDERAL PRIVACY LAW
Current U.S. laws have failed to protect consumers and
facilitate stronger cybersecurity efforts. The ambiguous and
complex regulatory environment of cybersecurity law has
created a host of problems for both consumers and U.S.
businesses. These issues, as well as the increased prevalence
of data breaches, make it clear that change is needed to make
laws more effective and provide better protection for
consumers. This Comment proposes two changes in the law
as a solution. The first change is for the Supreme Court to
provide a clear rule on Article III standing in a data breach
case. The second change is for Congress to pass a uniform
federal privacy law. The following subsections will explore
how these two changes will improve consumer protection by
providing incentives for companies to take action and protect
consumers both before and after a data breach.
A. Supreme Court Ruling Addressing Article III Standing in
Data Breach Class Action Cases
The current circuit split on Article III standing in data
breach cases leaves consumers with an uphill battle to hold
the company which neglected to protect their personal
information liable.348 Therefore, the first action that can be
taken is for the Supreme Court to follow the D.C., Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and allow the increased risk of
future injury to constitute an injury-in-fact for Article III

347. Id.
348. See supra Section II.B.
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standing.349
The Supreme Court may have this opportunity with the
class action lawsuits filed against Equifax. The facts
surrounding the Equifax data breach coincide with the
rulings in Attias, Galaria, Remijas, and Zappos. In each of
those cases, the circuit court held that the threat of future
harm from identity theft was sufficient to establish Article
III standing.350 Additionally, in those cases, cybercriminals
hacked into each defendant company’s system to steal
personal information of its customers such as names, dates
of birth, Social Security numbers, and driver’s licenses.351
These circuit courts all held that the threat of future harm
resulting from the breach and the costs of mitigating future
damages constituted an injury-in-fact for Article III
standing.352 Similarly, with the Equifax breach,
cybercriminals stole names, Social Security numbers, birth
dates, addresses, and driver’s license numbers.353 Therefore,
the victims of the Equifax data breach also have a threat of
future harm resulting from the data breach and will incur
costs to mitigate damages such as credit monitoring.354
The rulings in Attias, Galaria, and Remijas also provide
logical legal reasoning for why increased risk of future injury
constitutes an injury-in-fact. First and foremost, the entire
purpose of a hack is to make fraudulent charges or assume

349. See Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629–30 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 698–97 (7th Cir. 2015).
350. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629–30; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 390–91; Remijas,
794 F.3d at 698–97.
351. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629–30; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 390–91; Remijas,
794 F.3d at 698–97.
352. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629–30; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 390–91; Remijas,
794 F.3d at 698–97.
353. EQUIFAX, supra note 2.
354. See Villadiego, supra note 133; EXPERIAN CREDIT MONITORING, supra note
110.
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consumers’ identities at some point.355 A cybercriminal’s
motive for hacking a system is to use the stolen information
for their benefit or to sell it to others who can also use the
information to make fraudulent charges.356 Therefore, an
injury is “certainly impending” for a consumer whose data
has been breached, satisfying the immanency requirement
for an injury-in-fact under Article III standing.357
Additionally, any rational consumer would take the proper
steps to protect themselves from future harm after a breach
by monitoring their credit, checking their bank statements,
and modifying their financial accounts. As stated previously,
these mitigation efforts are not free358 and but for the data
breach, consumers would not incur the additional costs to
monitor their credit and other financial information.359
Accordingly, these costs are certainly an actual injury that
satisfies the “concrete and particularized” requirement for
Article III standing.360 Therefore, it is sound law and logical
355. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
356. Kristen L. Burge, Your Data Was Stolen, But Not Your Identity (Yet), ABA
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/
litigation-news/featured-articles/2018/your-data-was-stolen-not-your-identityyet/ (“A majority of circuits reason that ‘there is a “certainly impending” threat
that the affected individuals will be the victims of financial or identity fraud.
After all, the motive of the hackers is to use the stolen information for their own
benefit or to sell it to others,’ explains Newby. These circuits apply common sense
to data breach cases, Newby suggests. ‘The entire purpose of hacking a company
to swipe thousands of credit card numbers or personal identifiers is to misuse
that information for gain, like making fraudulent purchases or engaging in tax
refund fraud or identity fraud. Why should the people whose information was
compromised have to wait until that happens before getting some relief?’” quoting
Tyler G. Newby co-chair of the ABA Section of Litigation’s Privacy & Data
Security Committee); see also Villadiego, supra note 133 (discussing how
cybercriminals will use the information stolen in the Equifax data breach).
357. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013).
358. See EXPERIAN CREDIT MONITORING, supra note 110.
359. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
360. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). See also Remijas,
794 F.3d at 694 (holding that credit monitoring following a data breach
constitutes a concrete injury); Galaria, 663 Fed. App’x at 389 (holding that
plaintiffs suffered concrete injuries to mitigate imminent harm from the data
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thinking for the Supreme Court to hold that the victims of
the Equifax data breach have suffered an injury-in-fact
under Article III standing requirements. If the Supreme
Court is able to rule on the Article III standing requirements
in a data breach case, it will bring clarity to the law and allow
victims of a data breach to have their day in court. This will
give data breach victims the opportunity to hold the company
that did not protect their personal information liable.
In addition to giving data breach victims their day in
court, allowing for Article III standing in a data breach case
will incentivize companies to improve their cybersecurity
efforts to prevent future data breaches. Although some argue
that class action lawsuits do not act as a deterrence,361 there
is sound rationale and evidence that class actions deter
companies from bad behavior.362 Allowing for Article III
standing in data breach cases based on the threat of future
injury will lead to more class action cases against companies
that have their data breached. The threat of future class
action litigation will then act as a general deterrence 363 for
breach).
361. See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them:
Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 420–21 (2014).
362. Fitzpatrick, supra note 14. Fitzpatrick explains the legal theory of
deterrence and provides evidence that class actions deter wrongdoing. In a 1981
study, economists found that settlements from class actions for price fixing were
10 times greater than government imposed fines and that a deterrent effect came
from the threat of an award of private treble damages (citing Michael Kent Block
et al., The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. OF POL. ECON. 429, 441
(1981). Additionally, a recent study in 2010 of American securities fraud class
action lawsuits found that class action lawsuits induced companies to be more
forthcoming to their shareholders (citing James P. Naughton et al., Private
Litigation Costs and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence From the Morrison Ruling,
(May 2014) (unpublished paper on file with Kellog School of Management,
Working Paper updated February 2017))).
363. Fitzpatrick, supra note 14. General deterrence refers to how potential
wrongdoers respond to a potential lawsuit—that is, do potential wrongdoers
decide not to commit misconduct to begin with because they are afraid of lawsuits
against them? Whereas, specific deterrence is how an actual wrongdoer responds
to an actual lawsuit against it—that is, does the actual wrongdoer stop the
misbehavior after it is caught?
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these companies. The theory of general deterrence assumes
that people, and therefore people running companies, are
rational and that a rational person does not want to be
sued.364 With a lawsuit, a company will have to pay its own
lawyers and the plaintiff if it loses in court.365 Therefore, if
the misbehavior benefits the corporation less than the harm
it inflicts on others, then the corporation will rationally
choose not to engage in the misconduct.366 Consequently,
under the theory of general deterrence, the only time a
corporation will rationally choose to engage in misconduct is
when the benefits outweigh the harm.367
In the context of data breaches, companies are not
engaging in deliberate misconduct per se. Rather, companies
are not putting the proper protections in place to adequately
protect their customers’ sensitive personal information.
Applying the general deterrence theory to data breaches
means that class action litigation needs to deter companies
by having the cost of a class action lawsuit outweigh the cost
of putting in place more cybersecurity protections.368
Currently, there is not enough general deterrence for
organizations in America because the law is inconsistent
regarding Article III standing and not every circuit allows for
standing based on the threat of future harm.369 Therefore,
companies do not always have to pay for costly class action
litigation or treble damages if they lose in court because the
class action case does not even make it to the courtroom
without Article III standing. In short, there is not enough
incentive for companies to improve their consumer data
protection efforts because some circuits do not allow for

364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See id.
369. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2017); Whalen v.
Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017).
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Article III standing when a breach occurs.
If the Supreme Court were to resolve the current circuit
split and rule that increased risk of future harm from a data
breach satisfies the Article III standing requirements, it
would allow more consumers to file class actions that survive
a motion to dismiss and actually make it to discovery. This
will provide an initial remedy for breached consumers
because they will be able to hold the company that did not
protect their data accountable. Additionally, it will make
litigation costlier for companies that experience a breach
because they will no longer be able to win on a motion to
dismiss. Then, applying the theory of general deterrence,
more lawsuits will incentivize companies to improve their
cybersecurity efforts to better protect consumer information
because the potential cost of litigation will outweigh the cost
of protecting consumer information.370 As a result, the
companies’ improved cybersecurity and consumer protection
efforts will lead to achieving the ultimate goal of preventing
data breaches in the first place so that consumers’ personal
information is not stolen and in the hands of cybercriminals.
B. A Federal Data Breach Notification Law
The infamous Equifax data breach and the overall rise
in data breaches has led to many lawmakers to call for a
federal data breach law.371 Likewise, the recent passing of

370. See supra notes 366–67 and accompanying text.
371. See S. 2289 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (Senators Elizabeth Warren
(Mass.) and Mark Warner (Va.) introduced the bill “Data Breach and
Compensation Act” fining companies $100 for each consumer whose information
is compromised and adding an additional $50 fine if the company failed to notify
officials in a timely manner). See also S. 2197 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017)
(Senators Richard Blumenthal (CT), Bill Nelson (FL), and Tammy Baldwin (WI)
introduced a bill titled “Data Security and Breach Notification Act.” This bill
would require, among other things, notification of the affected parties within
thirty days and notification to law enforcement if the breach involves more than
10,000 individuals); The Application Privacy, Protection, and Security Act of
2018, H.R. 6547 115th Cong. (2018) (this law would govern how data is collected
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the GDPR and CCPA has led those in industry to call for a
uniform federal privacy law to ease the compliance burden in
the United States.372 Therefore, the United States Federal
Government can follow the lead of the European Union and
California by creating a comprehensive federal privacy law.
The Federal Government can use the GDPR and CCPA as an
example by adopting the successful provisions of those laws,
while also improving upon the unsuccessful provisions that
garnered significant criticism.373
After analyzing American cybersecurity issues, as well
as the GDPR and CCPA, there are five necessary provisions
to be included in a U.S. federal privacy law. Accordingly, a
U.S. federal privacy law must: (1) establish the data rights
of all American citizens; (2) clearly define terms within the
privacy law; (3) include a comprehensive data breach
notification requirement; (4) truly be harmonized and
and secured on mobile devices); The Data Care Act of 2018 S. 3744 115 Cong. (2d
Sess. 2018) (Introduced by Senator Brian Schatz (Haw.), this bill would require
companies to use reasonable care when collecting data and places restrictions on
how data can be shared.).
372. See Dan Clark, A PLEA FOR PROTECTION; Will a federal data privacy
law save the day?, CORP. COUNSEL (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/2019/02/04/a-plea-for-protection-will-a-federal-data-privacy-lawsave-the-day/?slreturn=20190609162321 (reporting that Intel, Alphabet Inc.
(Google), and IBM have all weighed in on a federal privacy law in the United
States); see also Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: More than 200 companies
are calling for a national privacy law. Here’s an inside look at their proposal,
WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
paloma/the-technology-202/2018/12/06/the-technology-202-more-than-200companies-are-calling-for-a-national-privacy-law-here-s-an-inside-look-at-theirproposal/5c0819be1b326b60d128012e/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dc52e58ebfc9
(stating that the Business Roundtable, a group of more than 200 retailers, tech
companies, and financial institutions, call on the U.S. to adopt a national privacy
law that would apply the same data collection requirements to all companies
regardless of sector.); Tim Cook calls for US federal privacy law to tackle
‘weaponized’
personal
data,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
24,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/24/tim-cook-us-federalprivacy-law-weaponized-personal-data (stating that Apple’s CEO Tim Cook,
Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerburg, and Google’s CEO Sundar Pichai, all support
a federal privacy law in the U.S.).
373. See supra Section IV.B.
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uniform across the United States; and (5) the law must have
a reasonable and just penalty for noncompliance. By
incorporating all five of these provisions in a federal privacy
law, the United States will ensure that cybersecurity efforts
in America are improved and consumers’ private information
is better protected in the future.
The first necessary provision for a U.S. federal privacy
law is a provision establishing the data rights of all American
citizens. Similar to the GDPR and CCPA, a U.S. federal
privacy law needs to establish basic data rights for all of its
citizens.374 At the very least, a federal privacy law should
give U.S. residents the right to be informed as to how
companies are using their personal information, the right to
have their data amended or deleted, and ensure that their
data is not being collected and shared without their
consent.375 As a result, this provision will give Americans
more freedom and control of their personal information
before and after it is collected by an organization.
Second, a federal privacy law must clearly define its
terms. Namely, a U.S. federal privacy law must clearly
define the term “personal information,” which is something
the GDPR and CCPA failed to accomplish.376 This will make
compliance with the law much less confusing and costly.
Accordingly, this law will not drive out small and medium374. See id.
375. See David Meyer, In the Wake of GDPR, Will the U.S. Embrace Data
Privacy?, FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/11/29/federal-dataprivacy-law/; see also Hearing on Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Era of Big
Data Before the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce and S. Comm. On Consumer
Protection and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement by Denise E. Zheng,
Vice President, Technology and Innovation, Business Roundtable) (stating that
at the heart of the Business Roundtable proposal is a set of core individual rights
that they believe all consumers should have, including the right to transparency
regarding a company’s data practices, consumers’ right to exert control over their
data, the right to access and correct inaccuracies in personal data about them,
and the right to delete personal data).
376. See supra notes 343–347 and accompanying text (explaining the issues
with the GDPR and CCPA’s definition of “personal information”).
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sized businesses with its large compliance costs.
Additionally, a clear definition of personal information will
enable organizations to continue to perform important
privacy-protection practices. The second term that must be
clearly defined in a U.S. federal privacy law is the term
“business.”377 This will allow each business in America to
know whether or not it must comply with the law. Again, this
will lower compliance costs because organizations will know
whether or not they must comply with the law and plan
accordingly. In the aggregate, clearly defined terms in a U.S.
federal data breach notification law will allow organizations
to comply with the law in an efficient manner and ensure
that consumers’ personal information is protected.
Third, and arguably most importantly, a U.S. federal
privacy law must have a comprehensive data breach
notification provision. Taking from the GDPR, this data
breach notification clause must have a time-limit requiring
organizations to notify the proper authorities within seventytwo hours of the breach.378 However, this provision would
only require notification that the breach occurred and not
require a full investigation yet. This will prevent a company
and its executives from engaging in any bad behavior such
as insider trading before the breach is made public. 379
Additionally, it will put the government on notice of the
377. See supra notes 341–42 and accompanying text (explaining the issues
with the CCPA’s definition of “business”).
378. See supra pp. 1180–81 and accompanying notes (explaining the GDPR’s
72-hour notification requirement); see also 23 NYCRR § 500.17 (This New York
State Department of Financial Services regulation requires financial
organizations to give notice to the New York State Superintendent of Financial
Services within 72 hours of identifying that a cybersecurity event has occurred.).
A federal data breach notification law mirroring these statutes would ensure that
all consumers are informed of a data breach properly and reduce the ability for
corporate executives to misbehave, such as by selling securities of a corporation
before notifying the public of the breach.
379. See supra pp. 1152–53 and accompanying notes (discussing the
investigation into Equifax’s executives for potential insider trading violations
following the infamous 2017 breach).
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breach, but not be overly burdensome for companies because
they will not have to do a full investigation of the breach
within just seventy-two hours. Therefore, following
notification of the proper government authorities, an
organization can do a full investigation into the breach with
oversight from the government.
Then, a U.S. federal privacy law must also incorporate a
time-limit in which a company must notify the consumers
affected by the breach. Congress can conduct research to
determine the appropriate amount of time, but an analysis
of the current state data breach notification laws shows that
requiring notification within thirty days of a breach to
affected consumers would be appropriate.380 This thirty-day
time limit will give an organization ample time to conduct a
full investigation. Additionally, this requirement will ensure
that consumers are notified of a breach in a timely manner
so they can take the proper steps to mitigate any losses and
protect their personal information from further exposure to
cybercriminals through credit freezes, credit monitoring, and
the like.381 Combined, these two notification requirements
will give government notice of a breach to police any bad
behavior by the breached organization, as well as allow the
organization to conduct a full investigation of the breach and
then notify the affected individuals in a timely manner.
The fourth requirement of a data breach notification
provision in a U.S. federal privacy law would be a uniform
manner in which individuals are notified. As such, a U.S.
federal privacy law must be truly harmonized. The GDPR
tried to harmonize the data privacy laws in the EU, but, as
stated previously, the GDPR failed to do so.382 The United
States should take this opportunity to create a uniform
federal privacy law that will preempt the fifty separate state
380. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
382. See supra pp. 1178–80 and accompanying notes.
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privacy laws.383 As stated prior, the fifty separate data
breach notification laws are a compliance nightmare for
organizations in America.384 All fifty of these notification
laws have different requirements for the manner in which
organizations must notify individuals affected by a breach. A
proposed solution is to require organizations to inform
individuals affected by a breach via an email, phone call, and
a letter in the mail. This will ensure that all affected
individuals are notified of the breach because the majority of
Americans utilize either email, physical letters, or
telephones. In addition, an organization that experiences a
security breach will no longer need to comply with fifty
separate data breach notification laws, rather, it will only
need to look to one federal privacy law for all of its
notification requirements. Therefore, a truly harmonized
federal privacy law will ease the compliance burdens for
organizations and allow these organizations to focus on data
protection rather than simply compliance with a vast
amount of privacy laws.385
Finally, the fifth requirement for a federal U.S. privacy
law is that it must have a reasonable and just penalty for
noncompliance. The penalty for violating a federal U.S.
privacy law will act as a specific deterrent to organizations
that violate the law.386 Specific deterrence refers to the
383. Jedidiah Bracy, In Push for U.S. Federal Privacy Law, State Preemption
Will Depend on the Details, IAPP: THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://iapp.org/news/a/in-push-for-us-federal-privacy-law-state-preemptionwill-depend-on-the-details/; see also Hearing on Protecting Consumer Privacy in
the Era of Big Data Before the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce and S. Comm.
On Consumer Protection and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement by David
F. Grimaldi, Jr., Executive Vice President, Public Policy, Interactive Advertising
Bureau) (arguing that a U.S. federal privacy law “should reduce consumer and
business confusion by preempting the growing patchwork of state privacy laws.”).
384. See supra pp. 1139–42 and accompanying notes.
385. Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and
Privacy,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(Jan.
30,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection.
386. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 14, at 184. The threat of class action litigation
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effects of enforcement against a particular violator on that
violator’s future conduct.387 Applying specific deterrence to a
federal privacy notification law would entail punishments on
an organization for violating specific provisions of the law.
Therefore, the punishment to a company for violating the
U.S. federal privacy law would act as a specific deterrent to
that violating organization. Specific deterrence would shape
that violating company’s behavior to come into compliance
with the law for fear of being penalized again. As a result,
consumer personal information is better protected because
this company is now in compliance with the law and properly
protecting its customers’ data.
However, the punishment for noncompliance with a
federal U.S. privacy law cannot be so severe that it
completely wipes out some businesses. With the GDPR’s
fines starting at €10 million or €20 million depending on
which article is violated, there is serious concern that these
enormous fines could push small businesses out of the EU.388
With 30.2 million small businesses in the United States,
small businesses make up 99.9% of all business in the United
States.389 Additionally, United States small businesses
employed 58.9 million people, or 47.5% of the workforce, in
from a data breach will act as a general deterrent and force organizations to
improve their cybersecurity efforts to protect against a data breach. See also
supra Section V.A. Whereas, a federal U.S. privacy law will act as a specific
deterrent for companies, deterring them from violating the federal privacy law.
387. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE, 8–9 (2010). Farhang explains that
there is considerable evidence that private lawsuits are an effective tool in
shaping the behavior of both private entities and governmental subunits.
Farhang also notes the aspect of general and specific deterrence in affecting
behavior. Specific deterrence is the “enforcement against a particular violator on
that violator’s future conduct, while general deterrence refers to effects of visible
enforcement in the legal environment on other would-be violators who have yet
to actually be the targets of enforcement, and hope never to be.”
388. See supra notes 315–16 and accompanying text; see also supra note 325–
26 and accompanying text.
389. 2018 Small Business Profile, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY
(2018),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/2018-Small-BusinessProfiles-US.pdf.
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2015.390 Consequently, the U.S. economy cannot afford to
have a fine so large that it pushes small businesses to
bankruptcy.391 Thus, the U.S. federal privacy law must find
the delicate balance when setting its fines so that it acts as a
specific deterrent, but does not drive out small business in
America.
A proper solution would be to set a fine that is a
percentage of the organization’s revenue. The GDPR’s fines
in Article 83 are a percentage of an organization’s revenues,
but only if that fine would be greater than €10 or €20 million,
depending on the violation. The United States can improve
upon Article 83 of the GDPR by setting the fines for
violations of a federal U.S. privacy law at a fixed percentage
of an organization’s revenues. By using a percentage of
revenue approach rather than a massive fine like the GDPR,
a U.S. privacy law can act as a specific deterrent to
companies but will not drive them out of business. A
percentage of revenue approach will achieve this purpose
because the fine will then be a sliding scale depending on the
size of the business that violated the U.S. federal privacy
law.392 Therefore, by setting fines as a percentage of an
390. Id.
391. See Hearing on Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Era of Big Data Before
the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce and S. Comm. On Consumer Protection
and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement by Roslyn Layton, Visiting
Scholar, The American Enterprise Institute) (“To do business in the EU today,
the average firm of 500 employees must spend about $3 million to comply with
the GDPR. Thousands of US firms have decided it is not worthwhile and have
exited. No longer visible in the EU are the Chicago Tribune and the hundreds of
outlets from Tribune Publishing [ . . . ] Of course, $3 million, or even $300
million, is nothing for Google, Facebook, and Amazon (The Fortune 500 firms
have reportedly earmarked $8 billion for GDPR upgrades.), but it would bankrupt
many online enterprises in the US. Indeed, less than half of eligible firms are
fully compliant with the GDPR; one-fifth say that full compliance is impossible.”
(footnotes omitted)).
392. For example, a 4% fine of Facebook’s revenues will be a strong enough
punishment to deter Facebook from violating the law. At the same time, a 4%
fine of a small business’ revenue will also be a strong enough punishment to deter
that small business from violating the law, while also not driving the small
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organization’s revenues, a U.S. federal privacy law can both
act as a specific deterrent to shape a business’ future
behavior, but not be so drastic that it drives small businesses
out of the industry.
CONCLUSION
In today’s digital age, data breaches have become
commonplace. In 2017, there were a record high 1,579 data
breaches,393 with the most damaging data breach being the
Equifax data breach in the summer of 2017.394 Although the
American legal system currently does not have enough
protections for consumers in place, the Equifax data breach
presents an opportunity to improve consumer protection in
America. Accordingly, following the Equifax breach,
lawmakers have already proposed legislation to improve
consumer protection.395
However, this Comment argues that there are two
distinct steps that can be made within the legal community
to improve consumer protection. First, the Supreme Court
can rule on Article III standing in a data breach case and
clearly state that risk of future harm from a data breach
constitutes an injury-in-fact under Article III.396 This will
allow victims of a data breach to have their day in court with
a class action lawsuit and deter companies from failing to put
into place proper cybersecurity protections for their
customers’ valuable personal information. Second, a federal
privacy law will ensure that those affected by a data breach
are properly notified of the breach in a timely manner.397 A
federal law with appropriate fines for noncompliance will
business to bankruptcy.
393. See supra note 42 at 3.
394. See supra Part III.
395. See supra note 370.
396. See supra Section V.A.
397. See supra Section V.B.
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also act as a specific deterrent for companies to ensure that
they comply with the law. This will ensure that victims of a
breach are notified in a timely manner and allow them to
make the appropriate accommodations to protect themselves
from further harm.
Overall, cybersecurity is a complex and new area of the
law. As Dwight Schrute said, identity theft is “not a joke” and
it’s time America took it seriously.398 Data breaches pose a
significant threat to consumers, affecting their personal and
financial security. The severity of data breaches requires
society and the law to adapt accordingly and ensure that
consumers are protected. If the proper steps are taken, the
American legal system can provide proper protection for its
citizens.
Editor’s Note: This Comment was selected from our 2017–18
Note & Comment competition. Simultaneous with its
publishing, the Federal Trade Commission announced that it
reached a settlement of approximately $700 million with
Equifax in relation to the 2017 Equifax data breach. For more
information regarding this settlement, see the Federal
Trade Commission’s statement here: https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/refunds/equifax-databreach-settlement.

398. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

